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Özet 
 
Kıbrıs adasının ikiye bölünmüşlüğü yıllardır sürmekte ve Kıbrıs sorunu da 
uluslararası arenanın en uzun süreli çözülemeyen meselelerinden biri haline gelmiştir. 
2004 yılında Annan Planı reddedildikten sonra, Kıbrıs sorununa en uygun çözümün 
bulunması için Kıbrıs Cumhuriyeti‟nde büyük bir tartışma başlamıştır. İki toplumlu, 
iki bölgeli bir federasyon altında yeniden birleşme, ortak onay alması muhtemel bir 
çözümün temeli olarak gözükmektedir. Araştırma yöntemlerinden odak gruplarını 
kullanmak, bana Kıbrıs Rum gençliğinin Kıbrıs sorununun çözümüne ilişkin bakış 
açısı hakkında yeteri kadar ipucu verdi. Tez, üç ayrı bölüme ayrılmıştır: 
milliyetçiliğin zaman içinde Kıbrıs‟taki etkisini, Annan Planı‟nı ve benim 
deneklerimin onu algılayışını, ve son olarak da odak gruplarının bahsettiği, hem 
durumu nasıl analiz ettiklerini hem de Kıbrıs Rum gençlerinin hislerini anlatan, altı 
çizilmesi gereken önemli faktörleri ifade ediyorum. 
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Abstract 
 
Cyprus remains for decades divided and the Cyprus conflict is one of the 
longest standing unresolved issues of the international community. After the rejection 
of the Annan Plan in 2004, there is a big discussion in the Republic of Cyprus 
regarding the suitable solution for the Cyprus dispute. Reunification under the Bi-
Communal, Bi-Zonal Federation appears to be the only base of a solution that seems 
ultimately capable of common acceptance. Using the research method of the focus 
groups, the participants gave me enough clues about the Greek-Cypriot youth‟s 
perspective for the solution in Cyprus. This thesis is divided in three different parts: 
the effect of nationalism in Cyprus through the years, the Annan Plan and my 
informants‟ perception about it and in the end, I have stated various factors which 
were mentioned in the focus groups and they are quite important to be highlighted, as 
they analyze the situation but also the feelings of the Greek-Cypriot youngsters today!       
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
Do the Greek-Cypriots youth honestly want to find a solution regarding the 
Cyprus dispute? Can be the “otherness” an obstacle for the reconciliation of the island 
under a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation? 
On 24
th
 April 2004, Cypriots lost their chance to change the future. The UN 
plan (Annan Plan) was rejected by Greek-Cypriots to the extent of 76% while the 
Turkish-Cypriots accepted the Plan by 65%. Ever since the failure of the referendum, 
various analysts, professors and journalists tried to find the reason for the results on 
both sides; why Greek-Cypriots chose to vote “No” to the Annan plan and why 
Turkish-Cypriots approved the plan; whether the Greek-Cypriots‟ “No” vote was a 
rational decision based on their evaluation after reading the Plan or whether they have 
been misled into voting “No” by their political parties. Six years after the Annan Plan 
no one asked Cypriots what they really wanted.  
The purpose of this thesis is to understand the dispositions of Greek-Cypriot 
youngsters with the prospects of reconciliation and co-existence based on the focus 
groups. The truth is hidden beyond the Greek-Cypriot‟s result to the Annan plan. The 
Greek-Cypriots vote should be seen as a “No” to the reformations of the Annan Plan 
or to the concept of re-unification. This study focus on the new generation‟s 
intentions: people who are around twenty five years of age. In my opinion, this group 
is interesting for two reasons. First of all, these people have no personal experiences 
from the war in 1974. They were born and grew up in a divided island. This division 
seems to be a reality for them. They have grown up around older people who were 
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repeating their stories. Surrounded by these stories of the “others1”, subconsciously 
they have been affected from their words.  
Focusing on the new generation of the island, the study cannot be representative 
of the intentions of Greek-Cypriots. The aim of my thesis is to represent just the 
Greek-Cypriot youth‟s way of thinking. As it seems, it is a significant field which 
worthy of being analyzed. Not only because of the importance of the group but also 
because it will show finally at least what Greek-Cypriot youth want. I have chosen 
this subject because as a member of this group, discussing with people of my age, I do 
not have a clear idea what is the most “desirable” solution.  
Trapped in the midst of this complicated idea of a solution, my thesis is based 
on the following understanding: 
- How prepared the Greek-Cypriot youth is, to approve any solution regarding 
the Cyprus dispute? 
In this evaluation, I have attempted to find an answer to this question. The text that 
will follow is based on the results which have been taken by the research method of 
the focus groups.  
 In order to achieve this and understand their beliefs, I analyzed the simple 
question above into further small questions: 
- Are the Greek-Cypriots familiar with the Bi-zonal, Bi-communal, Federation 
terminology? 
                                                             
1 This term is used from Prof. Niyazi Kizilyurek’s book: “the deadlock of nationalism”.  
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- To what extent do Greek-Cypriot youth agree to the solution based on the Bi-
zonal, Bi-communal Federation? 
- Have the Greek-Cypriot youth read and understood the Annan Plan? 
- Do they want any improvements or are all the endeavors for nothing? 
- What is the new generation‟s perception about Turkish-Cypriots? 
In order to find responses to those questions, I decided to use the research 
method of focus groups (qualitative research). Utilizing the results with this kind of 
research, I sought to explain their attitude, as it concerns the acceptance of a future 
solution and consequently the co-existence with the Turkish-Cypriots. Following 
these guidelines I have prepared the questions that I would like to ask in the focus 
groups in order to get an answer to the questions (Appendix 1). My purpose is to 
show that even if thirty six years have passed since the military intervention/invasion 
in 1974, according to my focus groups‟ results, it seems that youth did not change 
mentality and it is faithful to its ancestors. 
In order to understand how the Cyprus dispute had begun, a historical flashback 
is necessary to be illustrated. So, in the second part of this chapter I will highlight the 
historical background of the Cyprus problem, starting from the period when Cyprus 
was a colony of the United Kingdom, the EOKA struggle in 1955 and the 
establishment of the Republic of Cyprus. Under which circumstances United 
Kingdom, Turkey and Greece had signed the Zurich and London Agreement. I will 
try to show how some not so vital incidents led to that tragedy of 1974. What were the 
real reasons, excuses and the results of the military intervention/invasion. Then I will 
describe the first negotiations in 1977 and the progress of the negotiations until the 
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Annan Plan, the changes that happened between 1977 and 2004, and the reason that 
UNFICYP is still trying to help Cypriot leaders to compromise for a better future of 
the island. 
As my thesis is based on the results from the focus groups that I have done, the 
second chapter analyzes the methodology that was followed. In order to understand 
how the Greek-Cypriot youth think, I preferred to use the qualitative research method 
using the focus groups. In this chapter, the whole procedure of the focus groups is 
described, from the first step until the findings: what was the reason which I decided 
to utilize this method, how I decided to choose my sample and how I got the results.  
The third chapter deals with the historical and political effects of Nationalism in 
Cyprus. After some nationalistic ideas which were reported in the focus groups, a 
particular historical background of nationalism (from the early 1950s until nowadays) 
but also the changes that have been done in people‟s mind could not be missed. In the 
beginning, I will present the changes of nationalism through different periods and the 
types of nationalism that was raised during those periods. After that, I thought that it 
was necessary to illustrate Greek-Cypriots youth‟s perception about Turkish-Cypriots. 
The term of “the other” and how this effected a generation who actually did not have 
any relationship with “the other”. Moreover, the nationalistic outcome through 
education will be explained, as education plays a major role to flourishing 
nationalism. 
The forth chapter is referring to the Annan Plan. Annan Plan was the first 
attempt for reconciliation. It will always be a main point at the Cyprus history. In my 
focus groups there was a set of questions regarding the Annan Plan. The answers that 
I have got were various. The chapter starts with the definition of the term Bi-zonal, 
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Bi-communal Federation and how the new generation understand this terminology. 
The results of the Plan and how they have been formed are included. I will continue 
explaining a lot of factors that were noticed in the focus groups which actually 
affected their vote; the role of the political parties, the influence of Tassos 
Papadopoulos‟ speech to the Greek-Cypriots souls, mass media.  
The fifth chapter is the chapter which actually gives you an idea about youth‟s 
perception about politics and the Cyprus question. The structure of this chapter is 
based on the answers and the comments of the participants of the focus groups that I 
have found quite remarkable.  Considering the multiple beliefs of my informants, I am 
trying to discover with my thesis if youth are ready to accept a solution. It is described 
how important the factor of time is for concluding to a solution, the economical 
differences between the two communities and how this dissimilarity changed people‟s 
perception of the Cyprus problem. Furthermore, how the youth feels about the fact 
that Cyprus joined the European Union and its consequences. As the elections in the 
North part of Cyprus were one week before my focus groups, I found it appropriate 
also to ask them what their feelings were about Eroglu and Talat. So, their ideas about 
Turkish-Cypriot leadership are included in this chapter.  
In the last chapter, I will try to summarize the opinion of the Greek-Cypriot‟s 
youth who participated to the focus groups about the reconciliation. The answer to my 
questions will be presented here comparing the data between the focus groups. I am 
afraid that the results can surprise a lot of people, Cypriots or not. This chapter will 
give the chance to the reader to have a synopsis of what the new generation thinks 
about the problem of the Republic of Cyprus. 
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The sources that have been used are primarily Greek books, articles and 
newspapers that focus on these factors. Nevertheless, the historical background has 
been covered by international books as well. Also I have tried to compare my data 
with other surveys in order to have a better picture of the new generation‟s intentions. 
The reason that I mostly use Greek references is because the subject is so specific that 
you cannot easily find resources anywhere else. It has to be mentioned that the quotes 
have been translated by the author.  
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Historical Background 
In order to understand the creation of the Cyprus question and the involvement 
of Turkey, Greece and United Kingdom to the problem, the reference to the historical 
background will start from 1878. For more than three hundred years, Cyprus was 
under the rule of Ottoman Empire. On 4
th
 of June 1878 though, Turkey and Britain 
signed a secret treaty in Istanbul which if there was any attempt from Russia against 
the Sultan, UK had to support him. As a return, the Sultan agreed for Cyprus to be 
under British rule and administration (Lamprou, 2008: 20).  
According to J. Joseph, the history of Cyprus can be dived in three different 
periods:  
1) The colonial period until the proclamation of the establishment of the 
Republic of Cyprus. 
2) From 1960 to 1974. The treaties that have been signed for the foundation of 
Cyprus, the functionality of the constitution of the new state, the internal 
conflict between Turkish-Cypriots and Greek-Cypriots, EOKA B‟ actions, the 
Greek coup d‟état and the Turkish military intervention/invasion. 
3) After 1974 to the present. The dominant element of that period has been the 
de facto division of the island and the continuing military occupation of the 
north part of Cyprus by Turkey. Furthermore, it will describe the attempt of a 
foundation of the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus”, the endeavors for a 
solution, the negotiations, the Annan Plan but also the accession in the 
European Union. 
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The colonial period until the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus 
When Cyprus became a British colony, Greek-Cypriots were glad about this 
great, unexpected change. They considered that the new masters would be better than 
the oppressors Turks, as they were Christians as well. From the beginning, Greek-
Cypriots believed that there was hope that the British would resign from their 
privilege on Cyprus and they would help Cyprus to unify with Greece (Enosis), as 
they have done also with the “Seven Islands”. However, these hopes did not 
correspond to the truth. Seven Islands had immiscible Greek population and there 
were near to Greece. In contrast, Cyprus had a respectable Turkish minority and it 
was much closer to Turkey then Greece (Lamprou, 2008: 21).  
After Turkey joined the World War I next to the Central Power (Germany, 
Austria), UK considered the secret treaty in Istanbul invalid and Cyprus became an 
official British colony in 1914. Greek-Cypriots still believed that this was positive 
progress as UK could never refer to Turkish privilege on Cyprus. Once again, 
Cypriots realized what was going on with the most difficult way: neither with the 
Treaty of Serves in 1920, nor the Lausanne Treaty in 1923, Cyprus became a Greek 
territory.  
In 1931, Greek-Cypriots rose against the British rule, claiming for national 
release and a formation of a new constitution. Then, UK realized that they had to 
change the constitution not in favor of Cypriots but because of the flexibility that 
there was to the previous one. So, they removed the 1882‟ constitution and they 
enforced a new colonial dictatorship.  
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Greek-Cypriots even if they were in bad circumstances never stopped to wish for 
Enosis (Unification) with motherland Greece. Greek-Cypriots followed the motto 
“Nothing less than Enosis”.  The left party AKEL tried to mobilize people in order to 
collect signatures supporting the memorandum which clarified the desire of Greek-
Cypriots for Enosis and send it to the United Nations. Nevertheless, the Cypriot 
Church decided to make her own plebiscite. The plebiscite started on 15
th
 of 
November 1950 and it was finished on 20
th 
of November. 95.7% of Greek-Cypriots 
signed the petition for Enosis with Greece. The paradox of this memorandum was that 
the AKEL expected Turkish-Cypriots to sign it as well. In fact, Unification with 
Greece automatically would constrain Turkish-Cypriots to leave the island. So, as 
much as the Greek-Cypriots were fighting for Enosis, the affiliation between Turkey 
and Turkish-Cypriots was becoming stronger. 
After the end of the wars, Britain was trying to keep her last colony and 
consequently its effect with the Middle East. In 1950, after the Archbishop Makarios 
B‟s death, Makarios C‟ took his place. A clever man, just thirty seven years old, the 
new archbishop Makarios the third, was ready to try everything in order to succeed 
unification. The plans of Britain started to go under when Makarios set aim of his life 
was the unification with Greece, ignoring the rules of international policy and the 
Cold War. Therefore, he wanted to resort to United Nations but Cyprus at that time 
was not an independent state so the resort to the UN had to be presented from Greece. 
After two World Wars, Greece could not even help itself, how was it possible to help 
Cyprus? As the, that time president of Greece, G. Papandreou said to the mayor of 
Nicosia T. Dervi: “Greece now is breathing with two different lungs, a British one and 
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an American lung. It would not risk it to suffer from asphyxia just because of the 
Cyprus situation
2” (Lamprou, 2008: 34).  
On 1
st
 of April 1955, Greek-Cypriots started the liberating struggle against the 
British colonials. EOKA was a Greek-Cypriot nationalist military organization, 
fighting against the British rule for self-determination and in the end for Enosis with 
Greece. The Leaders of this organization were the archbishop Makarios and George 
Grivas. EOKA‟s struggle was characterized as one of the most pure and heroic fights 
of the Greek nation in general. Although, it has to be mentioned that I strongly 
disagree with Sabahattin Ismail,‟s characterization about EOKA. He described it as a 
terrorist organization, something that in my opinion is definitely incorrect. In 1959 the 
EOKA‟s struggle was ended with the London and Zürich Agreements. They assigned 
Makarios to be the President and Dr. Kucuk the Vice-President of the new state. On 
13
th
 of December 1969 the first official presidential elections took place and Makarios 
won the elections over 66% of the Greek-Cypriot population. 
 
From the foundation of the Republic of Cyprus in 1960 to the Turkish military 
intervention/ invasion in 1974 
 Cyprus became an independent state on 16
th
 of August 1960, when Turkey, 
Greece and UK signed the Zürich and London agreements. Yet, the official 
celebration of the Republic of Cyprus is on 1
st
 of October. These agreements 
consisted of a new constitution and three other treaties: the Treaty of Guarantor, the 
                                                             
2 “Η Ελλάσ αναπνζει με δφο ξζνουσ πνεφμονασ, τον ζνα αγγλικόν και τον άλλον αμερικάνικον. Δεν 
μπορεί εξαιτίασ του Κυπριακοφ να κινδυνεφςει να πάκθ αςφυξία.” 
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Treaty of Alliance and the Treaty of Establishment of the Republic of Cyprus (PIO, 
2008:39). The Greek-Cypriot community but also Turkish-Cypriot community did not 
actually participate in the process of editing the treaties or even the Constitution. In 
fact, the people who were more affected from the treaties did not have the opportunity 
to vote for them. According to B. Ecevit, “it was the first time in history that three 
countries agreed to create a forth state in order to continue their friendship” 
(Kiziyurek, 2009: 89). Nevertheless, the Treaty of Guarantee was very important. 
Under this treaty, signed by the UK, Turkey and Greece but also by the two 
communities, both Enosis and Partition (Taksim) were banned. 
 However, even if the Republic of Cyprus was founded and became an 
independent state none of the two communities were ready to abide by the new 
constitution. In particular, the archbishop Makarios declared that the Republic was the 
beginning to succeed Enosis (Kakoulli, 2003: 50). Under these circumstances, it was 
not difficult for a new conflict to arise. According to S. Sonyel, in some cases 
independence had even magnified the old disputes. Soon, the Greek-Cypriot President 
Makarios, and the Turkish-Cyrpiot Vice-President Dr. Fazil Kucuk, along with the 
ethnically constituted Council of Ministers and the House of Representatives, began 
to disagree on a number of issues, such as the establishment of an army, the 
distribution of the civil service posts between the Greeks and Turks on a 70:30 ratio, 
the levying of income tax, the question of separate Turkish municipalities, and other 
problems (Sonyel, 2003: 18). It was obvious that the constitution was a good 
theoretical attempt of balancing both communities‟ interests but as it seemed, in 
practice it was completely different. As De Smith noticed, the Constitution of Cyprus 
probably is the most inflexible constitution of the world. It is definitely the most 
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detailed and the most complicated. It is weighted with caveats and counteracting, 
procedures and substantial guarantees, reservations and prohibitions (Aimilianides, 
2003: 10).  
 As the constitution could not work properly, the years after that pre-signify a 
lot of problems between the two communities. As Clerides characterizes the period 
from January to December 1963: “Preparation of the tempest” (Clerides, 1988: 210). 
Makarios, as a president of the country realized that it was necessary the constitution 
to be changed. So, he presented to Dr. F. Kucuk “the Thirteen Amendements”. In 
Makarios‟ view, these amendments were required to the Republic in order to work 
fairly. But in fact, these amendments were again turning Turkish-Cypriots to a 
minority. How was it possible, Turkish-Cypriots, an equal community to the Greek-
Cypriots, to accept a change like this? So, Turkey and Turkish-Cypriots rejected 
Makarios‟ proposal. In the name of a regular function of the constitution a new phase 
had started. However, it seems that also the Turkish-Cypriot community did not 
support the Republic of Cyprus as their desire for partition was also banned. For 
instance, Denktas, enforced the “from Turk to Turk” policy to the Turkish-Cypriot 
community. This policy had forbidden any kind of dealings with the Greek-Cypriots. 
It has to be mentioned that if someone would not take this policy seriously and keep 
associating with Greek-Cypriots, then he could be imprisoned. In the end, they had 
withdrawn from all the governmental ministries and offices. 
There is a rumor that the UK had been informed about those amendments. But 
there is no reason to clarify it if in the beginning the British encouraged Makarios to 
change the constitution with the thirteen amendments and later they just tricked him. 
It is cleared that Makarios‟ point of view was not how to improve the Zurich and 
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London Agreements but how to overthrow the treaties and consequently to achieve 
Enosis (Kakoullis, 2003: 66).  
From 1963 to 1967, Turkish-Cypriots and Greek-Cypriots were fighting in 
order to show their power. It started on 21
st
 of December 1963. Intercommunal 
clashes started at 2.30 am and continued until 30
th
 of December. These conflicts were 
stopped temporarily, after creating the “Green Line”. The term “Green Line” refers to 
the cease-fire line that divides Nicosia into two, the North and the South. It is called 
“Green Line” because Major-General Peter Young (a predecessor of the United 
Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus) had drawn the line on the map with a green 
pencil. In 26
th
 of December 1963, Makarios and Glaukos Clerides from the Greek-
Cypriot community, but also Dr. Fazil Kucuk and Rauf Denktas from the Turkish-
Cypriot community signed the agreement of the “Green Line”. According to that 
agreement, the “Green Line” was something temporary but in the end it became the 
most comprehensible element of dichotomy.  
Within the limits of this dissertation, the incidents will not be illustrated in 
every detail between the two communities in those five years, as it was a bloodshed 
period for both communities. In March 1963 though, the Peacekeeping Forces of 
United Nations took place in Cyprus (UNFICYP). Their assessment was to block any 
endeavor against the other community but as it seemed from the beginning of their 
establishment, they could not stop the conflict between the two communities. Their 
role was as an observer instead of an organization which can convince Cypriots that 
they have to stop fighting each other.  
In 1967 (21
st
 of April) the junta, under the command of Dictator George 
Papadopoulos, seized the power with a coup d‟état in Greece. With the help of the 
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junta in Athens, George Grivas created the EOKA B‟ organization to bring back the 
ideology of the Enosis which Archbishop Makarios seemed to avoid. EOKA B‟ can 
be referred to as a terrorist organization in the European civilized countries. It is 
connected to assassinations of Greek-Cypriots from the left party AKEL and Turkish-
Cypriots citizens. At the same time, TMT (Turkish Resistance Organization), a 
similar paramilitary organization which actually founded in 1957, started being more 
active after the appearance of EOKA B‟. EOKA‟B aim was Enosis with Greek and 
TMT‟s aim was partition of Cyprus. TMT is connected to the killings of left-wing 
Turkish-Cypriots and Greek-Cypriots as well.  
According to M. Drousiotis, EOKA B‟ was under dissolution just a little bit 
before the coup in Cyprus. So its members unanimously decided that the coup d‟état 
should wait for the right time. Nevertheless, Ioannides
3
 declined EOKA B‟ decision 
and he ordered to continue the implementation of their desire: the overthrow of 
Makarios (Drousiotis, 2003: 392). 
On 15
th
 of July 1974, the Greek junta succeeded in organizing a military coup 
in Cyprus with the approval of Demetris Ioannides. Their plan was still to overthrow 
Makarios as a President. In his place they present Nikos Sampson as the Dictator of 
Cyprus. To Turkey, Sampson‟s elevation to power signalled the possibility of Enosis 
again and therefore, Ankara prepared for a military solution to the problem 
immediately.  
The most important result of EOKA B‟s actions was the military intervention/ 
invasion of Turkey in Cyprus. In the name of the safety of Turkish-Cypriots, Turkey 
                                                             
3 In 1973, Dictator Demetris Ioannides took the place of George Papadopoulos. 
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took advantage of the situation and Turkish forces began landing on Cyprus five days 
after the coup d‟état (20th July 1974). According to the statement issued by B. Ecevit 
announcing that the Turkish armed forces were engaged in a peace operation in 
Cyprus “to end decades of strife provoked by extremist and irredentist elements” 
(Sonyel, 2003: 347). United Nations were calling to cease-fire. In the end, the 
endeavor of Turkey to occupy Cyprus led to the subsequent de facto division of the 
island. Makarios, as he confessed to the journalist Oriana Falatsi: “I could not imagine 
that the junta would be so foolish to order a coup against me without concerning the 
consequences. And I mean the Turkish invasion” (Lamprou, 2008: 466). Turkey did 
not find a resistance to occupy a part of the island, as no one was expecting it. 
Actually, even after the Turkish attacks, the AED
4
 had confirmed to the Greek-
Cypriots that it was just a Turkish military training activity (Lamprou, 2008: 523).  
Meanwhile, Turkey‟s military intervention/invasion caused the collapse of the 
junta in Greece and Ioannides was replaced by Constantinos Caramanlis. Nikos 
Sampson was also replaced by Glaukos Clerides in Cyprus.  
Turkey used as an excuse the Treaty of Guarantee to interfere with Cyprus. 
According to the article IV of the treaty: 
“In the event of a breach of the provisions of the present Treaty, Greece, 
Turkey and the United Kingdom undertake to consult together with respect to the 
representations or measures necessary to ensure observance of those provisions. 
                                                             
4 Greek Armed Forces Command. 
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In so far as common or concerted action may not prove possible, each the tree 
guaranteeing Powers reserves the right to take action with the sole aim of re-
establishing the state of affairs created by the present Treaty”. 
Turkey claimed that their reaction was a result of the inability to protect 
Turkish-Cypriots and to reinstate the status quo. According to Coufoudakis though, 
Turkish-Cypriots had never been in danger during the coup d‟état (2008: 202). In fact, 
more leftists Greek-Cypriots had been killed than Turkish Cypriots during the coup. 
Greece did not help Cyprus at all. While Turks were occupying the Cypriot 
territory, Greece was worried that if there was visible and obvious military help to the 
Cypriots, a new Greek-Turkish conflict could begin. A war between two allied 
countries of NATO should be avoided, considering that the attack of Turkey was 
against a territory which did not belong to the Greek dominion (Lamprou, 2008: 560).  
Finally, the Security Council of the UN was ready to publish the resolution 
against the Greek coup d‟état in Cyprus on 20th of July 1974. Because of the tragic 
events of that date, the Security Council in the end referred to the coup d‟état but to 
the occupation by Turkey as well. According to the Resolution 353/1974 (Appendix 
4): 
 §1 Calls upon all States to respect the sovereignty, independence and 
territorial integrity of Cyprus; 
§2 Calls upon all parties to the present fighting as a first step to cease all 
firing and requests all States to exercise the utmost restraint and to refrain from any 
action which might further aggravate the situation; 
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§3 Demands an immediate end to foreign military intervention in the Republic 
of Cyprus that is in contravention of the provisions of paragraph 1 above; 
§4 Requests the withdrawal without delay from the Republic of Cyprus of 
foreign military personnel present otherwise than under the authority of international 
agreements, including those whose withdrawal was requested by the Present of the 
Republic of Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios, in his letter of 2 July 1974; 
It has to be mentioned though, that they were pushing Turkey to a cease-fire 
even before this publication. The Secretary-General of UN, the Secretary-General of 
NATO, France which was at the head of the European Economic Community and 
Germany sent their messages Turkey to cease-fire immediately. Those who were 
pushing Turkey to cease-fire, they were also those who were worrying about a new 
Greek-Turkish episode, instead of the disaster that the military intervention/invasion 
would cause to Cyprus (Lamprou, 2008: 572). 
The Resolution 353/1974 of the Security Council at the fifth paragraph 
declared that Greece, Turkey and UK must enter into negotiations without delay in 
order to restore peace on the island. On 25
th 
July 1974, the Guarantor Powers has 
participated to the Geneva Gathering. Even before the end of the Geneva Conference, 
a second phase of the Turkish military intervention/invasion was a reality. On 14
th
 of 
August the Turkish forces began the new operation. After three days, there was a 
cease-fire again. But the resistance of Greek-Cypriots to the Turks was non-existent, 
so they actually gained more than they had wished for.  
The results of the whole operation of Turkey were the occupation of the 36.2% 
of the Cyprus territory, the 3% of the Buffer Zone and 165.000-180.000 Greek-
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Cypriots refugees. Beyond the economical collapse of Cyprus, the worst part was the 
fact that three thousand people have been killed and one thousand four hundred 
nineteenth Greek-Cypriots are still missing persons (PIO, 2008: 44). 
The point is that after the second phase of the military intervention/invasion, 
Turkey could not evoke that excuse of Turkish-Cypriots safety. In 23
rd
 of July, as it is 
referred above, the junta collapsed and the dictators were replaced by new presidents 
and the constitutional principles started to be restored in Cyprus. Turkey could claim 
the Turkish-Cypriots‟ rights during the first phase of the operation but it cannot be 
accepted in any pretext as it concerned the second phase. From a diplomatic point of 
view, Turkey made a big mistake which led to its isolation from the other countries 
(Kizilyurek, 2009: 192).  
 
After 1974 to the present situation 
After the Turkish occupation of the Northern part of Cyprus, negotiations 
started between the two communities. It is remarkable that the agreement between 
Denktas and Makarios in 1977, who actually signed the guidelines for the solution of 
the Cyprus problem which had to be based on the independent, Bi-communal 
Federation. There is a big argument if in that document Makarios and Denktas signed 
for the Bi-zonal solution. But it will be analyzed better in the forth chapter.  
Makarios died in 1977. Spyros Kuprianou, with no other candidates, was 
nominated as the new president of the Republic of Cyprus. In 1979, there was another 
agreement between Denktas and Kuprianou who had confirmed the guidelines from 
Denktas and Makarios agreement in 1977. 
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Denktas, one of the most powerful and charismatic leaders in Cyprus, realized 
that there was not any progress to the Cyprus dispute, on 15
th
 of November 1983 
purported to create an independent state in Northern Cyprus. His ambition was to 
establish the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus”. The Republic of Cyprus reacted 
immediately. It resorted to the Security Council asking for a withdrawal of one-sided 
declaration for independency of the TRNC (Joseph, 2000:123) According to the 
Security Council‟s resolution 541/1983 (Appendix 5) 
“Considering therefore that the attempt to create a "Turkish Republic of Northern 
Cyprus", is invalid, and will contribute to a worsening of the situation in Cyprus” 
The Security Council also calls upon all the states to respect the Republic of Cyprus 
and to not recognize any Cypriot state other than the Republic of Cyprus. Denktas 
endeavor proved unsuccessful.  
After the rejection of the foundation of “TRNC”, the Cypriot leaders from 
both sides negotiated for a better compromise but nothing was actually agreed. 
Different leaders became presidents but there was not any significant change that has 
to be mentioned. Every time, while they were negotiating and it seemed that they 
would find a solution, in the end one of the two sides was rejecting it.  
The next turning-point was in the summer of 1996. It was the worst post-1974 
flare-ups of violence which occurred on the ceasefire line that divides the Greek and 
Turkish areas of Cyprus (Bryant, 2004: 217). A Cypriot Motorcycle league organized 
an international protest against the division of the island. They started their trip from 
Germany and their aim was to cross the “Green-Line” and arrive to Kerinia (Girne). 
However, the Turkish armies warned that they would shoot anyone who would pass 
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the check-points. In the end, there were a lot of inter-communal conflicts in the buffer 
zone. Tasos Isaak was killed as he was trying to unbraid the barbwire. On the day of 
Isaak‟s funeral, his cousin, Solomos Solomou, entered the Green-Line and he tried to 
remove the Turkish flag. While he was trying to get the flag, someone shot him five 
times. It has to be mentioned that this “peaceful” demonstration could be watched live 
on the TV. As Waldemar Rokoszewski noticed, there were the worst inter-communal 
conflicts after 1974 and he supported that bloodshed was avoided because of the 
existence of the UNFICYP (Raptis, 2005). 
The first steps of the Cyprus accession into the EU started in 1990. According 
to the Commission, there were no insurmountable problems existing as far as the 
Cyprus economy was concerned but undoubtedly the division of the island was seen 
as a substantial obstacle to the EU accession (Dodd, 1999: 175). In 1996, 31
st
 of 
March, Cyprus opened the accession negotiations to join EU. However, there were 
many reservations among member states over admitting Cyprus. In the beginning, EU 
declared that Cyprus would only be allowed to join if it reached a peace agreement. 
The EU eventually cancelled this condition (Etingoff, 2006: 73). So, in 1999, in 
Helsinki, they signed that the resolve of the Cyprus dispute will not affect its 
accession to the EU. On 16
th
 of April 2003, Cyprus signed the Accession Treaty of the 
EU in Athens and it became an official member of the EU on 1
st
 of May 2004. 
In 2002, Kofi Annan, the new Secretary-General of UN proposed the Annan 
Plan No. 1 to the two communities for a solution. The Annan Plan was a United 
Nations‟ proposal to settle the Cyprus dispute and establish the United Cyprus 
Republic. Before 2004, the Secretary General submitted three different plans. 
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Nevertheless, for every plan there was an article or a point that one of the two 
communities could not accept.  
Since 2003, there was tremendous progress. Denktas changed his policy and 
he allowed the entrance of Greek-Cypriots to the occupied part. The opening of the 
buffer zone gave the opportunity for interchange. In order to cross the check-points 
though, Greek-Cypriots had to show their passport and get a temporary visa. The fact 
though that more than a million people had crossed the “borders” over five months 
illustrates that people have the curiosity and the will to have a relationship with the 
other side. But the failure at referendum of the Annan Plan, which will be described 
below, indicates that contact does not automatically or necessarily produce 
reconciliation (Bryant, 2004: 249). 
The most crucial year in the post-1974 period is definitely in 2004. On 24
th
 of 
April, the fifth Annan Plan was given as a referendum to the two communities. 
According to the 5
th
 Annan Plan, Cyprus will transform to a Bi-Zonal, Bi-communal 
Federation state. Despite of the Turkish-Cypriots‟ acceptance of the plan, more than 
75% of Greek-Cypriots voted “No”. Because of Greek-Cypriot‟s rejection, UN felt 
that they have been tricked from Tassos Papadopoulos and consequently from the 
Greek-Cypriots so they abandoned any kind of efforts to resolve the dispute.  
It was planned that Cyprus one week after the Annan Plan (1
st
 May) will join 
the EU. After the Annan Plan though, there was a rumor that the rejection of the plan 
will cost Cyprus the accession to the EU. In the end, nothing of those rumors came 
true and from that time Cyprus became a full member of the EU. 
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Meanwhile, in 2008, presidents from both sides have changed: Dimitris 
Christofias from the left party (AKEL) and Mehmet Ali Talat from the left party as 
well (CTP). It was the first time that left parties were in charge in Cyprus. So the 
UNFICYP wanted to take advantage of the new change, so the negotiations started 
again under the UN‟s shield. After two years, it seems that there is no progress. None 
of the communities were ready to change things.  
Unfortunately, on April 2010, TRNC had elections and a new president is in 
charge now. Dervis Eroglu belongs to the nationalist party UBP and he is the ancestor 
of Rauf Denkta‟s party. Before the elections, he announced that he would stop the 
negotiations. However, Turkey wants to join the EU, so it seems that did not let him 
doing whatever he wants. The negotiations are still in progress. No one can predict the 
results. The fact that one of the leaders is from the nationalistic part make the things 
much worse.  
Today, fifty years after the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus, it is still 
inquired how Cypriots can be reunited. Politically speaking, the scenario of finding an 
appropriate solution for both sides does not seem to be optimistic, especially after the 
Eroglu‟s election. However, as long as Turkey wants to join the EU, there is a chance 
for reconciliation. The Annan Plan was the first plan which had been given to the 
citizens of Cyprus as a referendum. Six years after this endeavor, people are more 
familiar about the kind of solution that will be accepted. In fact, as concerns Greek-
Cypriots, the Annan Plan was a concession that Turkish-Cypriots will remain into the 
island. I think that the post-Annan plan period had worked effectively. Both sides are 
preparing themselves for a solution. Hopefully, Cypriots would not miss again the 
opportunity of a settlement that will lead to a United Cyprus. 
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Chapter 2 
Methodology 
In this chapter I will explain the research design which had been used to find the 
answer to my research question: how prepared the Greek-Cypriot youth is, to approve 
any solution regarding the Cyprus dispute. In other words, I want to find out the 
intentions of the most important part of the population: the new generation. There are 
significant reasons why I have chosen youth to be the focus of this study.  First of all, 
in my opinion, the new generation is the future of any state but oft times no one cares 
about their opinion. Also this group did not have any memories about the tragic 
events in 1974, so I believe it will show how they perceive this dispute. In addition, 
the fact that I also belong to this group, gave me the chance to be aware of this 
position. It has to be mentioned that this research will investigate only the Greek-
Cypriot youth‟s way of thinking. 
 Methodologically, this study is based on a qualitative research method. 
Qualitative research involves an in depth understanding of human behavior. It is an 
interaction between an interviewer and a respondent in which the interviewer has a 
general plan of inquiry, including the topics to be covered but not a set of questions 
that must be asked with particular words and in a particular order (Babbie, 2007: 306). 
This exploratory research utilized focus groups to gather data about the subject.  
Focus groups are basically group interviews, although not in the sense of an 
alternation between a researcher‟s question and the research participant‟s responses. 
Instead, the reliance is on interaction within the group, based on topics that are 
supplied by the researcher who typically takes the role of moderator (Morgan, 1997: 
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2). The goal of a focus group is to obtain behaviors, perceptions, bias, feelings and 
attitudes about a selected topic. This method had been preferred as it was the only one 
which could give me in-depth analysis. Compared to individual interviews, focus 
groups can give a multiplicity of views very quickly. Questionnaires though were too 
“cold” to understand their real feelings and also it is easier to give as an answer 
something that they do not believe just in order to say something better than what 
he/she thinks.  Having six to eight people discuss the Cyprus issue at the same time, it 
was predictable that they would come to confrontation with others and in the end they 
would explain what they feel and why they have these opinions. 
In the beginning, a pilot study using the structured interview and the focus group 
process was field-tested with some Greek-Cypriots‟ youth who were living in Istanbul 
in that period. The pilot study consisted of five people (four female and one male). 
Based on their answers, there were some modifications to the questions in order for 
participants of the focus groups to understand better what I wanted to ask and avoid 
any confusion. In addition, according to their answers, some questions were added as 
I was expecting them to refer to other events but it seemed that it was not clear what 
was needed to be referred. 
Focus Groups must: 1) use homogeneous strangers as participants, 2) rely on a 
relatively structured interview, 3) have six to eight participants per group and 4) have 
a total of three to five groups per project (Morgan, 1997: 34). Participants though 
were chosen by using the snowball sample method. In snowball sampling, the 
researcher collects data on the few members of the target population, and then asks 
those individuals to provide information needed to locate other members of that 
population whom they happen to know (Babbie, 2007: 185). So, calling people who 
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live/left to a different country (i.e. in Unite Kingdom, in Greece or in Cyprus) gave 
me the opportunity to have samples with different background.  
As the nature of my research was a small scale study, using participants who may 
know each other was not a problem since none of the questions needed “sensitive” 
answers. So, I do believe that all the participants who may know each other would 
feel comfortable discussing any subject in front of everyone. They seemed to feel 
more comfortable and able to talk about the Cyprus problem because of the small 
number of the groups. In fact, sometimes I realized that they were giving more 
information that was asked for (i.e. what they have voted to the Annan Plan) and 
when I was telling them that it was not necessary to say it, they insisted that they 
wanted to share it with us. By having an inside perspective, it was easier for 
participants to trust me and share information with me without any reservation. 
In the focus groups, the role of the moderator (in this case mine) has to be able to 
control the audience. I never realize how difficult it would be, before my small 
experience. Especially as the first group was six men with a just one girl but also 
because I had the stress being the first time, it was difficult to control them, so 
sometimes the answers were not corresponding to some questions. Then, I realized 
that I have to ask them to stop when it was necessary or when they were giving the 
answer of another question. The nature of the focus group research is like that and you 
cannot expect what will happen. The moderator has to be ready to control any case 
that will arise. 
Participants who indicated a willingness to participate in a focus group were 
called and reminded three days and one day before of their focus group meeting. 
Focus Groups took place on April 6, 7, 9, 10 and 16 in Larnaca (Republic of Cyprus). 
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The participants were arranged into groups according to their characteristics 
(Appendix -1). I have chosen for the groups to be divided regarding their refugee 
status, their affiliation to a political party and their age. In particular, the first group 
was consisted of youngsters with one or both refugees‟ parents. There were two 
groups regarding the political views which were separated individually by both wings: 
left parties (AKEL, EDEK) and right parties (DISI, DIKO). As it concerns the age 
dimension, most of the participants were around twenty-five years old. The last group 
though was consisted of people around twenty-eight years old.   In my opinion socio-
economic status, educational levels and sex of the participant appeared to play little or 
no role in shaping preferences for a solution. Nevertheless, the groups had been 
organized in a way that also differs according to those variables which could be 
analyzed if needed. 
Five Focus Groups, involving a total of thirty seven male and female participants 
were organized at my place in order for people to feel more comfortable. Focus 
Groups discussion happened at different hours as some of the participants had to 
work, so the time of the discussions modulated according to their request. Also I had 
chosen the discussion to be in the Cypriot dialect and not in Greek, but also not even 
in formal speech, it will give the chance for the participants to answer the questions 
directly, without thinking of the appropriate words that may have to use for the focus 
groups. 
Each focus group began with a brief introduction explaining that the focus groups 
were the method that was preferred to assist my dissertation for my MA program. 
Also there was an explanation of the method of focus groups, as most of the 
participants were not familiar with this kind of research. Eighteen open-ended 
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questions were presented to each focus group one at a time. In this kind of questions, 
the participants had the time to express their feelings about the possibility of a 
solution. The question was read aloud and the participants had the opportunity to ask 
for clarifications if they were not sure what they had to answer. Moreover, it was 
emphasized that there were no right or wrong answers. The aim of the focus group 
was to listen to their perspective on that matter regarding their characteristics. 
Participants had to understand that there was no correct answer. Any answer was 
more than welcome. 
The eighteen questions were developed and pilot tested. Sample of the questions 
has been included in the appendices in the original and translated form (Appendix -2 
and 3). I avoid selecting questions which had a necessary historical background 
because, as it will be described below, there is a lack of Cyprus history at schools. All 
the questions were related to the post-Annan Plan period where almost all the 
participants were old enough to understand what happened. Sessions typically took 
about 90 to 180 minutes without a break because then it would be difficult for 
participants to concentrate on the subject again as some of the questions were chain 
questions.  
An Mp3 voice recorder was used to record each focus group interview. All the 
members of the group have been recorded with their verbal consent. The purpose of 
the recording was to increase the accuracy of the data collection but mostly it was 
better for me to concentrate on my participant‟s answers instead of worrying about 
taking notes. The Mp3 data has been transcribed. Full transcriptions were made of the 
conversations of the focus groups interviews. I have written the transcription in the 
Greek language but at the same time I have not paraphrased anything. So, if I thought 
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that the phrase could not give 100% the same meaning in Greek, I chose to write it as 
it was recorded, in the Cypriot language. No participant name was used which 
maintained the confidentially of the participants information. 
The results of the focus groups were analyzed through a sorting process to 
identify common themes. In order to familiarize myself with the data, an intensive 
reading of the transcript was necessary. Collecting information from my participants‟ 
answers gave me the chance to create different themes. These themes were mainly 
based on the repeating answers of the focus groups. I am glad that after this method, a 
lot of opinions have been written down. The quotes were then analyzed and reviewed 
within their themes so there were ready to be used in the proportional chapter. It has 
to be clarified that the results are just a sample of what my participants gave me as an 
answer and in any case, it cannot be generalized.  
Ethical considerations for focus groups are almost the same with all the other 
methods of social research. For instance, participants must inform about the purpose 
and uses of their contribution. In the case of focus group there is only one extra 
ethical issue to be considered: handling of sensitive material and confidentiality given. 
Participants also need to be encouraged to keep confidential the whole dialogue that 
they will contribute. As it is referred above, I followed the guidelines to avoid having 
any ethical issues in my research method. 
The results of my focus groups will be presented in the following chapters. It has 
to be referred that I have encoded the characteristics of each participant in order to 
avoid using all its characteristics in the text. A full description is given in Appendix.  
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Chapter 3 
Understanding the historical/political effects of Nationalism in Cyprus 
Nationalism within both communities was and still is the mainstay regarding the 
Cyprus dispute. Cypriots were too proud of their motherlands and consequently it was 
impossible to realize that their behavior/actions were actually against of their own 
country. The worst result of that nationalism though, was that Cypriots could not 
accept «the others». The otherness between Turkish-Cypriots and Greek-Cypriots was 
really strong as an idea to change people‟s mentality.  
A conflict, as a social phenomenon, appears when two interactive groups have 
uncompromising intentions (Joseph, 2000: 24). Even before the creation of the 
Republic of Cyprus, Turkish-Cypriots and Greek-Cypriots were fighting for various 
reasons. The differences in religion, language and history also did not contribute 
living together peacefully.  
Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots can be distinguished by their national  
characteristics; Greek-Cypriots can speak Greek, they are Christian Orthodox and 
they are identified with the Greek nation and Greek culture. Turkish-Cypriots can 
speak Turkish, they are Muslims and they are identified with the Turkish nation and 
the Turkish culture respectively. Therefore, both communities have completely 
opposite viewpoints concerning the political future of the island, the differences wide 
and varied.  
In order to understand the effects of nationalism in Cyprus, I will basically 
divide it into four phases: before the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus, from 
the establishment until the invasion/intervention, after intervention and from the 90‟s 
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until today. Within every period a different problem has evolved. The only common 
point is the revival nationalism on every incident.  
 
3.1.1 Before the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus 
Nationalism in Cyprus was not a new phenomenon. Its roots were evident even 
before the independence of Cyprus. As was mentioned previously, Cyprus was a 
British colony (1878–1959). The British were trying to hold fast to their last colony in 
Middle East. They did not realize the power of nationalism in Cyprus and how much 
it can inspire Cypriots.  
Greek-Cypriots from the beginning wanted unification (Enosis) with Greece. 
The island of Cyprus was historically connected with Greece so the Greek-Cypriots 
were ready to try anything in order to succeed Enosis. The fact that there was also a 
Turkish minority on the island never puzzled Greek-Cypriots and that was the crucial 
point of Greek-Cypriots: accepting Turkish-Cypriots as citizens of the same island. 
Nationalism was so deeply ingrained in Greek-Cypriot hearts therefore it was 
impossible to realize and accept anything else other than Enosis. But when there is an 
action there is always a corresponding reaction: the question of Enosis made Turkish-
Cypriots recoiled and it was at time that they realized the difference between 
themselves and Greek-Cypriots, was not only religion but it was based on something 
far more complicated (Litsas, 2000: 7). 
The British governors of Cyprus believed that the troubles stirred up by a 
nascent nationalism were created by the political leaders and that the average Cypriot 
would not, under other circumstances, be concerned with such matters, occupied as he 
supposedly was with his own quotidian affairs (Bryant, 2004: 163). They had ignored 
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the main force of people‟s mentality. Thus, the EOKA‟s struggle against the British 
colony was somehow predictable.  
It is true that before the end of WW II, Greek-Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots 
were living together harmoniously. Ploutis Servas presented the history of Cyprus as 
being one of peaceful coexistence between the two communities, with a “short 
parenthesis” of intercommunal strife, driven by the interests of the colonial power 
(Loizides, 2007: 172-189). Nevertheless education, economic development and the 
British colonial practices can be considered responsible for transforming the two 
communities against each other. The colonization, as it happened everywhere, was 
based on the separation of the communities and the ultimate aim was to discourage a 
common patriotism (Moudouros, 2010: 13). 
As Greek-Cypriots were watching the British colony lose all its colonial bases 
in 1950, they started to consider that Enosis (Unification) with Greece will be the best 
solution for them. People were ready to sacrifice their own lives in order to achieve 
Enosis. On the other hand, the British colony perceived that it was losing its power on 
the island so they set their policy of “Divide and Rule”. At that point Turkish-
Cypriot‟s nationalism started to take place. The colonials took advantage of the 
situation and they put Turkish-Cypriots on critical positions in the government i.e. 
policemen, for their own interest (Theofilou, 2010: 162), so they turned them against 
Greek-Cypriots and vice versa. It is not coincidental that more of Turkish-Cypriots 
did not fight against the British rule.  
The answer of Enosis for Turkish Cypriots was “Cyprus is Turkish”5. It was a 
reaction against the Greek-Cypriot demand about unification with Greece. As both 
                                                             
5
 “Kıbrıs Türk‟tür” 
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sides nationalism was trying to get form, Turkish-Cypriots‟ slogan was replaced by 
“Taksim (partition) or Death” which illustrates actually the desire of both 
communities to be united with their motherlands. Turkish-Cypriots wanted dichotomy 
of the island based on their nations. There is no doubt that the Cyprus issue arose 
from the conflict between two nationalisms and was absolutely increased with the 
involvement of the British rule.  
In 1955, Greek-Cypriots started fighting against the colonials. EOKA‟s aim was 
only and nothing less than Enosis with Greece. It has to be clarified that the struggle 
was not about increased rights of Greek-Cypriots but for union with their motherland 
Greece, for which all of their history had been prepared. Hence, freedom meant 
Enosis, because freedom was the realization of an already imagined, inevitable future 
(Bryant, 2004: 166).  
 
3.1.2 1960 – 1974 
On 1
st
 October 1960, the Republic of Cyprus was founded. As it can be 
assumed, independency was not Cypriots‟ plan. None of the communities wanted to 
be independent. It was an agreement between the involved parties; Turkey, Greece 
and United Kingdom. Cyprus once again was an object within their hands. 
No one was ready to accept this solution. According to J. Joseph, it was 
impossible to expect Turkish-Cypriots and Greek-Cypriots to act as Cypriots. Even if 
with great deal of effort it was very difficult for them to discard their motherlands. So 
the Republic of Cyprus never validated ideologically from both sides. Especially for 
Greek-Cypriots the independence of Cyprus in 1960 was just a temporary situation in 
order to succeed Enosis. But also Turkish-Cypriots believed that the establishment of 
the independent Cyprus was a transitional period to achieve Taksim (Joseph, 2000: 
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77). As Makarios and the Greek-Cypriot élite believed Turkish-Cypriots are Cypriots 
who can live peacefully at the island as long as their behavior does not block Enosis 
(Kizilyurek, 1999: 39-41).   
In 1963 Turkish-Cypriot and Greek-Cypriot relations were intense. The starting 
point was when Makarios decided to illustrate the “13 points” to Dr. Kucuk. There 
was a proportional distribution of power according to the population as Greek-
Cypriots were considering Turkish-Cypriots as a minority on the island. Consequently 
Turkish-Cypriots did not accept the fact that they were treated this way, so the tension 
within communities arose. Between 1963 and 1967 the bi-communal incidents could 
not be controlled by authorities. TMT and EOKA‟B made their existence more 
obvious to Cypriots. A lot of deaths and disasters took place during that period but 
neither was ready to give peace a chance. Nationalism once again was the outright 
winner.   
In 1967 junta was in power in Greece. When junta decided to appear in Cyprus 
too, the bi-communal conflict was at its zenith. The aim of the coup d‟état was to get 
rid of Makarios as president and try to accomplish the beloved Enosis. Turkey, as one 
of the Guarantor powers and also as the most affected part of the island, reacted to the 
Greek junta with a military intervention/invasion and occupied the 37% of the island. 
The Turkish government found as an excuse that the Greek coup d‟état was actually 
one step to unification which was prohibited by the Republic of Cyprus‟ constitution. 
According to the Turkish explanation, the nationalistic behavior of junta was a 
straightforward threat to the Turkish-Cypriot community of the island (Joseph, 2000: 
118).  
1974 was also the end of an era that has since never returned. As a result of the 
military intervention/invasion, there was a forced shift of the communities and since 
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that time Turkish-Cypriots live on the Northern part of the island and Greek-Cypriots 
to the South. 
 
3.1.3 After 1974 
1974 was certainly the worst period the history of Cyprus, not only for Greek-
Cypriots but Turkish-Cypriots as well. People were not ready for the new change; 
they had to realize that both parties were the losers. The obsession of Enosis or 
Taksim led to a divided island. Now the obstacles were not only the both sides of 
nationalism but the de facto separation of the communities.  
The latest phase had to face the truth: that the situation was new and 
unexpected. Greek-Cypriots had to accept the defeat and the consequences of it: the 
loss of their houses, the death of their loved ones and relatives, the division of the 
island and the obligatory conception of a new life in unfamiliar places. 
Contemporaneously Turkish-Cypriots had to accept the new facts as well, but 
furthermore, the settlers and the embargo because of the intervention/invasion. After 
1974, the Turkish-Cypriot community was completely depended on Turkey in all 
fields, from education up to and including the economy. 
Nevertheless, a new form of nationalism had developed. On Greek-Cypriots‟ 
side, the motherland was the cause of the Turkish military intervention/invasion and 
on Turkish-Cypriots‟ side, they had to count on Turkey 100%. However, my thesis 
will be to concentrate on Greek-Cypriots‟ nationalism. 
After 1974 Greek-Cypriots realized that they actually were “Cypriots”. It was 
really a comedy of errors that Greek-Cypriots, in order to feel like Cypriots, had to 
lose part of their island. The biggest result of the Turkish military 
intervention/invasion though was the temporary jostle of Greek-Cypriots‟ nationalism 
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and the rise of the ideology of Cypriotism (Mauratsas, 1998: 81). It is not a 
coincidence that before 1974 the date of the independence was not celebrated at all 
and now it is considered as one of the most important dates of Cypriot history. It was 
about the same time also that the Greek flag was replaced by the Cypriot flag 
(Mauratsas, 1998: 82). The differences between Greek-Cypriot nationalism and 
Cypriotism will be illustrated in the next sub-chapter. 
In 1983, Rauf Denktas tried to legalize TRNC as it was described above. His 
request was rejected and since then Turkish-Cypriots officially are depended only on 
Turkey. Even if from this dependence follows safety, it can be recognized that 
Turkish-Cypriots have been alienated from the outside world and consequently this 
mirrors a lack of independence and recognized identity (Joseph, 2000: 248).  
However, Cypriotism did not last as it should. The main reason that Greek-
Cypriots‟ nationalism was pushed to a rebirth, was the victory of a new party in 
Greece called PASOK in 1981 (Mauratsas, 1998: 100). It was a sign that their 
motherland had been changed and it is not the same Greece that betrayed its own 
“child”. It was the first time since the episode of 1974, when once again the Greek 
flag flew in Cyprus. 
New generations grew in that environment; Greek-Cypriots were divided 
between the Greek nationalism and Cyrpiotism and Turkish-Cypriots the Turkish 
nationalism and the Cypriot proportionate nationalism. As ex-president Rauf Denktas 
said “there are no Turkish-Cypriots, no Greek-Cypriots and no Cypriots. Do not even 
dare to ask if we are Cypriots! We would take this as an insult. Why? Because in 
Cyprus the only thing that is Cypriot is the donkey.”(Kizilyurek, 1999: 102) 
The result should not surprise anyone: in the end the biggest enemy of Cyprus 
was their own nationalistic folk. The new generation is living separately. They do not 
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have any relation between “the others”. How can nationalism be destroyed when there 
is no change in a situation? 
It was a shock in evidence when the participants in the focus groups used: 
“Greece – Cyprus – Enosis” and “Turk is good only if he is dead”6. It was a creation 
of more than sixty years hence. Several generations have developed with this mindset. 
A lot of people have been fanaticized and they share the same mentality with previous 
generations. It is amazing to see that the youth have been patronized more or less by 
nationalism. 
In 2003, since the crossing points were opened, it was the first time after 1974 
when Cypriots could have any connection with the other side. As Rebecca Bryant 
illustrates, “Recent contacts between Turkish-Cypriots and Greek-Cypriots show that 
there are many bonds of friendship and neighborliness that have survived the violence 
provoked by nationalist politics and the separation of decades” (Bryant, 2004: 249).  
The first experience was too optimistic.  
According to my research findings and as one of my participants (B-OG)
7
 
quoted that he does not consider Turkish-Cypriots as his enemies. It is the whole 
culture; the history of their country that he believes to be his enemy
8
. As he pointed 
out, politics are something completely different from the everyday life and people can 
realize it at a point.  
1974 was certainly a tragic year for both communities and in 2004, with the 
rejected referendum of Annan Plan came the next tragedy. Cypriots had to face up to 
                                                             
6
 “Διιάο-Κύπξνο-Έλσζε” θαη “Σνύξθνο θαιόο, κόλν λεθξόο” 
7 All through the text, the participants’ characteristics will be used as they were coded (Appendix 1) 
instead of full analysis.  
8
  “δελ ζεσξώ ζπγθεθξηκέλα ηνλ Σνπξθνθύπξην ερζξό κνπ. Δίλαη ηνλ όιν πνιηηηζκό, ηελ όιε ηζηνξία 
ηεο ρώξαο πνπ ηνλ ζεσξώ ερζξό κνπ”. 
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the truth. But when your mind has been indoctrinated with nationalistic ideas so many 
years, it is difficult to accept anything else other than that indoctrination. It was a vital 
momentum that Cypriots found unable to accept. As one of my informants (Γ-NR) 
noticed that it was difficult to erase the idea of “Turks get out from Cyprus” and 
directly to say “Yes” to the referendum”. 9 None of the parties of the island had 
prepared their citizens to accept a solution alike this. The new generation was just 
manipulated from the people who lived throughout these fact forming times. The fear 
against the other, the hate against people who believed in something different and the 
lack of trust to Turkish-Cypriots made them suspicious.  
The combination of those feelings and the division of the island led to the 
isolation of the two communities. The new generation until 2004, had not a clue how 
Turkish-Cypriots were. In particular, in every group processed there was always one 
member, who was illustrated that before 2004 if someone was asking him to describe 
Turkish-Cypriots, they described them as aliens and devils. It was shocking after 2004 
when they realized that they are humans as we all are
10
.  
In my own research there were some exceptions in the groups where parents did 
not raise them with nationalistic ideas. So there were some people who admitted that 
they feel Turkish-Cypriots are exactly like themselves and they prefer to speak with a 
liberal Turkish-Cypriot instead of a Greek-Cypriot who is a fanatic or belongs to the 
                                                             
9
  “Γελ γίλεηαη από ην έμσ νη Σνύξθνη από ηελ Κύπξν ζην πάκε ζην δεκνςήθηζκα». 
10
 “απηνί νη άλζξσπνη πνπ ήηαλ ζην κπαιό κνπ ζαλ εμσγήηλνη, ηειηθά είλαη άλζξσπνη”. 
“ήηαλ θαλνληθνί άλζξσπνη”. 
“είλαη θαλνληθνί άλζξσπνη κνπ έθαλε ηξνκεξή εληύπσζε”. 
“εγώ παξαμελεύηεθα όηαλ θαηάιαβα όηη είλαη αθξηβώο ηα ίδηα πιάζκαηα καδί καο”. 
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extreme right wing
11
. It was impressive that the only people who stated phrases like 
this belonged to the left parties. In addition, my first focus group which consisted of 
young Cypriots with one or both parents refugees, agreed that it would be better in 
Cyprus if the ethnic origin would not be a criterion of trustworthiness. The new 
generation is trying to change with difficulty due to years of brainwashing. 
 
3.1.4 Greek-Cypriot Nationalism Vs Cypriotism 
As my thesis focuses on Greek-Cypriot intentions, I will clarify the differences 
between the Greek-Cypriot nationalism and Cypriotism in order to understand the 
ideologies and the political actions that came up later. 
According to Kaisar Mauratsas, Cypriotism is a political ideology which places 
Cyprus in the position of a Greek nation. It denies any relation with the Greek 
nationality by definition and supports that Cyprus has its own characteristics which 
makes it completely different and independent from the motherland (1998: 85-90).  
Cypriotism failed to become a credible alternative to dominant nationalism in 
the first half of the twentieth century. For one thing, Leftists suffered repression from 
both: the British colonial authorities and the dominant ethnocentric Church (Loizides, 
2007: 172-189).  Cypriotism nevertheless made its appearances dynamically after the 
tragic events in 1974. It was a reaction to the Greek-Cypriot nationalism and their 
desire for Enosis. Cypriotists never refuse their Greek ethnicity or the cultural origin 
of the island. It has to be mentioned that there was a development of Cypriotism in the 
Northern part of the island as well.  
                                                             
11
  “πξνηηκώ λα θάλσ παξέα κε Σνπξθνθύπξην πνπ λα έρεη θηιειεύζεξν κπαιό παξά κε έλα 
Διιελνθύπξην θαλαηηζκέλν αθξνδεμηό.” 
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As I perceived the ideology in my focus groups has not changed. Almost thirty 
years after this reaction the main focus of the ideology was highlighted from one of 
my focus groups‟ participants. He (E-F) said the most characteristic phrase of 
Cypriotism: “Cyprus belongs to Cypriots and Cypriots must be able to make decisions 
on their own
12”.  
According to the “Cyprus 2015” survey, when Greek-Cypriots were asked how 
they feel about their nationality, it appears that they split into two categories: the ones 
who believe that they are in the same level Greeks and Cypriots and the other 
category who believe that they are more Cypriot than Greek. Although, there is not 
big difference as the percentages are 45% and 29% respectively. Interestingly only 
1% answer that they feel more Greek than Cypriot. However, it seems from the 
“Youth in Cyprus” survey, that a definite resultant factor shows the new generation is 
more confident about its nationality. 48% of youth identifies itself as a Cypriot, 
another 17% identifies itself as more Cypriot than Greek and 28% identifies itself as 
equally Cypriot and Greek. The results show that there is an obvious trend towards 
the new generation‟s feelings that their heritage is truly Cypriot. 
Nowadays, the clash between the ideology of Greek-Cypriot nationalism and 
Cypriotism corresponds to the political argument between the two biggest political 
parties of the Republic of Cyprus; the left party AKEL and the right party DISI 
(ΓΖ΢Τ). Paradoxically in 2004 DISI was the only political party which supported the 
Annan Plan. Specifically at the end of Tassos Papadopoulos‟ speech on 7th of April 
2004, individuals were celebrating the historical “NO” of the president by waving the 
                                                             
12
 “ε Κύπξνο αλήθεη ζηνπο Κύπξηνπο θαη νη Κύπξηνη πξέπεη λα απνθαζίδνπλ”. 
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Cypriot flag at the president‟s palace. This show of flags confirmed the complicated 
existence of Cypriotism. 
On the other hand, Greek-Cypriot nationalism began in the early 1920‟s. The 
aim of that group was nothing less than Enosis with Greece. The conservation of the 
group, the obsession of unification and their disability to realize the new facts were 
the main reasons after which the military intervention/invasion could not find any 
support from the people. However the failure of Cypriotism to take advantage of the 
new facts led to the coexistence of both groups in Greek-Cypriot community. 
It is not a coincidence that even in the focus groups, young people were 
obviously divided. The right-wing‟s members followed the idea of Enosis, any signs 
of tolerance to and also the denial towards Turkish-Cypriots (one of the most 
nationalist‟s announced ones state that if there were elections to throw out conquerors 
from the island, she wants them to leave in order to keep alive Hellenism and “our” 
history
13
). Unlike the leftists who are entirely contrary to them. They believe that they 
are anti-nationalists, they seek for a relation with Turkish-Cypriots and their aim is the 
reunification of the citizens of Cyprus. Finally it seems neither both recognize 
common characteristics, the most important of these being consistent nationalism and 
intolerance.   
 
3.2.1 “The other” 
In Cyprus, territorial self-determination is a principle cause of the conflict. In 
addition to this, the cultural features of the two separate nations legitimize the 
exclusion of the opposite collective (Innes, 2008). “The other” is a term that Prof. 
                                                             
13
 “αλ είρε εθινγέο ζην λα θύγνπλ νη θαηαθηεηέο ηεο Κύπξνπ, λα θύγνπλε! Γηα λα δηαηεξήζνπκε ηνλ 
ειιεληζκό θαη ηελ ηζηνξία καο” 
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Niyazi Kizilyurek used in his book in order to show the tension of Cypriots to 
distinguish themselves from the other community. The existence of the “other” 
legalizes the group of “we”. In that group there are only heroes who support their 
national land (1999: 121). The idea of “the other” is based on the extent of tolerance 
in both communities. 
Living more than 35 years apart can create an anxiety against the people who 
are staying in the other part of the island. People who feel insecure will act in a way to 
produce fear, bias and nationalism. In this case, a person with those elements can 
become more fanatical and conservative and dedicates himself to conservation of 
language, tradition and its culture. As a female (Θ-NR) stated at the focus group 
“when you do not live with someone, you are afraid of them. Your mentality is not 
changing”14. 
As the years are passing, it is becoming more complicated for the two 
communities to be intergraded. After the geographical division of Cyprus and the 
permanent separation of the communities, national identities of each community are 
becoming stronger, creating actually two completely different nationalities that 
happen to live next to each other. According to Süleyman Demirel15 Cyprus is a 
geographical, social and economic entity which cannot be divided (Cumhuriyet, 
1989). Cypriots do not yet understand these words 
My research showed that some people, even from the new generation, do not 
want to have any relationship with the other side. I could not believe that there was at 
least one person in every focus group who preferred “the other to live there while we 
                                                             
14 “άμα δεν ηεισ με κάποιον, τον φοβάςαι. Δεν αλλάηει θ νοοτροπία ςου.” 
15Ex-president of Turkey. 
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continue to live here
16”. This phrase described the bias of Greek-Cypriot youth as 
regards to the Turkish-Cypriot community. Nevertheless, a female member from my 
groups (Z-R), who actually studied in Turkey, declared that her experience of living 
with Turks and Turkish Cypriots, who supposedly are the worst enemies for Greek-
Cypriots, made her realize that she can reside normally with these people and that 
they are so similar and yet this they do not understand
17
. It appears that even if they 
had grown separately, the Cypriot‟s mentality would still be unchanged.  
What is quite noticeable in these interpretations of a single event is that official 
Greek-Cypriots line portrays Turks, as the eternal enemy generally drawing no clear-
cut distinction between Turkey and Turkish-Cypriots (Bryant, 2004: 224). In my 
research, many times members of the focus groups needed the others to clarify if they 
are talking about Turks or Turkish-Cypriots. Generally the leftists were agreed that 
there is a big difference between Turks and Turkish-Cypriots but the rightists believe 
that there is no difference between either. Paradoxically, a somehow open-minded 
female from the left party (E-L) said that “intrinsically Turks and Turkish-Cypriots 
are one and the same. They have the identical way of thinking. They are fanatic 
Muslims”.18 It was also reported from a male (B-OG) that: “I grew up with the 
expression “Turk is your enemy‟. My grandmother was always telling me a Turk is a 
Turk. There is no such thing as a Turkish Cypriot. A Turk is always a Turk”.19 
                                                             
16 “τηίνοι ποτηί, εμείσ ποδά” 
17 “πιγα κι ζηθςα με τουσ Τοφρκουσ, τουσ Τουρκοκφπριουσ, που οι Τοφρκοι είναι ο φόβοσ μασ ο 
μεγάλοσ, και κατάλαβα ότι μπορϊ να ηιςω μια χαρά με αυτοφσ τουσ ανκρϊπουσ και ότι είμαςτε 
τόςο κοντά και δεν το ξζρουμε”. 
18 “βακιά είναι το ίδιο πράγμα ο Τοφρκοσ και ο Τουρκοκφπριοσ. Ζχουν τθν ίδια ςκζψθ. Είναι 
μουςουλμάνοι φανατικοί”. 
19
 “εγϊ μεγάλωςα με αυτι τθ λζξθ ο Τοφρκοσ είναι εχκρόσ ςου. Κι θ γιαγιά μου, μου λζει ο τοφρκοσ 
είναι Τοφρκοσ. Δεν ζχει Τουρκοκφπριοσ. Ο Τοφρκοσ είναι πάντα Τοφρκοσ.” 
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According to another survey called “Youth in Cyprus” the vast majority (86%) 
of Greek-Cypriots seem to feel that Cyprus is somehow “theirs”. This percentage 
confirms Greek-Cypriot‟s angle that they have been the “original” inhabitants of the 
island traceable from 3,000 years ago, which makes them the real natives, with 
historical or natural rights to the land.  
It is heart wrenching when such a tiny country cannot recognize “the other”. 
Greek-Cypriots forget that the group they do not accept also consists of humans such 
as them. It is time to get rid of the bias and make a concerted effort to leave the past 
behind, making them truly worthy of their destiny.  
“I am a Turk and you are a Greek, and I am one in a race and so too you are”20. 
Even if the song was written about the relation between Turks and Greeks, the main 
point is the same: both sides are people and they had to be treated as that. Cypriots 
must realize that the solution can be found peacefully, with some political changes 
and the most important the growth of a consensus mentality. In this sense, a member 
of the focus groups (Γ-NR) stated that if you cohabit with “the other” and you break 
the myth of he is a Turkish-Cypriot, he is Greek-Cypriot, he is Turk, you come up 
with the human subject: if he is a good person or not
21”.  
 
3.2.2 “Pseudo-state” 
Pseudo- is the prefix that Greek-Cypriots use when they want to say something 
regarding “the others”. This prefix shows that Greek-Cypriots do not accept the 
                                                             
20 “ Τοφρκοσ εγϊ κι εςφ ΢ωμιόσ, κι εγϊ λαόσ κι εςφ λαόσ”. Lyrics from the song: “Mes tou Vosporou 
Ta Stena” by George Dalaras. 
21 “άμα ςυμβιϊςεισ λίγο με τον άλλο και καταρρίψεισ αυτό το μφκο είναι Τουρκοκφπριοσ, είναι 
Ελλθνοκφπριοσ, είναι Τοφρκοσ, καταλιγεισ ςτο κζμα ανκρϊπου. Αν είναι καλόσ ι όχι”. 
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Turkish-Cypriots. Calling everything which is related to the North by using the prefix 
pseudo does not mean that automatically annul exists. The fact that the TRNC is 
legally invalid
22
 does not make Turkish-Cypriots also “pseudo people”. They also live 
in Cyprus and this is a reality.  
At my focus groups, there was a question about the presidential elections of 
TRNC. When I was asking about the pseudo-elections, there was always someone 
who was asking why I have used the word pseudo. On the other hand, when I was 
saying only elections, there was someone else who clarified that these were pseudo-
elections. There was an interesting conversation about the prefix pseudo at the “Non-
Refugees focus group. In fact, one of the participants mentioned that the President 
Christofias wished Talat good luck in the elections. He argued about Christofias‟ 
action because as he said how can you wish good luck to someone if you do not 
recognize them?  
The rejection of the rapprochement leads to the rejection of the existence of 
Turkish-Cypriots as well. There is no doubt that there is a necessity for an effective 
endeavor towards co-existence between the two communities. The latest survey 
illustrated that seven years after the Crossing points opened, only 6% of Greek-
Cypriots have Turkish-Cypriot friends, unlike the latter who said they have already 
made friends with Greek-Cypriots (Youth in Cyprus, 2009: 121). As Kaisar 
Mauratsas clarifies, it cannot be illustrated as a rapprochement while for the most 
Greek-Cypriots, at least in the new generation, it was actually the first approach 
(Mauratsas, 1998: 196).  Where there is a will, there is a way. Every Cypriot has to try 
at least to succeed unity through the otherness. 
                                                             
22 According  to the declaration of the Security Council (Appendix 5).  
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3.2.3 The value of neighbour 
The real meaning of neighborhood is significant. Through the use of 
neighbourhoud it becomes evident of the real intention of both communities to have 
any kind of a relationship. The feeling and the relation that can be raised between 
neighbours is something unconceivable, something that can help Cypriots to change. 
The fact that Cyprus is a small island, the relationships between people function well 
as a small community. That means that in Cyprus still there is a more human 
relationship between people, something that is lost in big cities. 
Living next door to someone, who is more or less different to you, is like a 
double-edged sword. On the one hand, you are getting into an “obligatory” relation, 
which you like because you have the opportunity to come across new people and 
consequently new cultures. On the other hand, at the same time this obligatory 
relationship can be like a noose around your neck. Even if you do not want it, you 
have to accept it and if you are not ready to accept something like that then there is a 
possibility of problems arising. 
According to my results from the focus groups, one of my participants (A-R) 
noticed that she had to speak with her neighbour and this is what she wanted to avoid; 
not having any kind of a relationship because if they are living next to her, it is 
unavoidable that they become friends
23
. It has to be clarified that the power of the 
relationship between neighbours was not clear before my focus groups. It was obvious 
to me that no matter who is your neighbour, you will have the relationship that you 
want to have. No one will force you to communicate or not communicate with your 
neighbour.  
                                                             
23
 “κα πρζπει να του μιλϊ κι εγϊ αυτό κζλω να αποφφγω. Να μθν ζχω ςχζςθ μαηί τουσ γιατί αν ηει 
δίπλα ςου, κζλεισ ι δεν κζλεισ, κα φιλζψεισ μαηί του”. 
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There has been intensive research about “neighbours” at the “Building trust” 
survey (2006: 4-13). Willingness to have Turkish-Cypriot neighbours remains at quite 
high levels, 62-63%. However, the youth are ambivalent. 50% of the 18-34 years old 
still favour co-existence with Turkish-Cypriots. In both communities women tend to 
be less in favour of co-existence than men. It is interesting because women in general 
are more apathetic about the Cyprus question. Also it could be thought that it is easier 
for women to have a relationship with their Turkish-Cypriot women neighbours. On 
the issue of refugee status, in both communities it is the refugees who have been 
turning away from co-existence. This is probably related to the dispute over property, 
which directly affects most refugees from both communities. 
In contrast, in “Cyprus 2015” survey‟s results, over 50% would not mind if they 
will have Turkish-Cypriot neighbours (2009: 5). At the same time another survey took 
place but this one concerns only the youth‟s opinion (2009: 116-117). Approximately 
25% of Greek-Cypriots would only feel “positive or very positive” having a Turkish-
Cypriot neighbor. In order to understand the motives behind their negative answers, 
they have been asked which the main reason for their answers was. As it comes out, 
the primary reason was their ingrained belief that Turkish-Cypriot are their enemies 
(50%) while the second most cited reason was the difference in religion (38%). 
Can this be the final solution? An obligatory relationship which in the future 
will evolve to a great relation? A lot of members illustrated in the groups that if they 
could have the chance to meet Turkish-Cypriots, maybe they will realize the 
similarity of both communities. In particular, as an open-minded young male (Γ-F) 
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said: the whole creation of propaganda can be demolished automatically, just with a 
meeting and dialogue. For the people who are prepared to accept it at least.
24
 
There is never any preparation for people to live together. Without the basic, 
everyday life‟s relation, any kind of a political solution will be a disaster for the 
island. If Greek-Cypriots recognize the importance of a neighborhood and the whole 
idea behind it (tolerance, respect, appreciation) then possibly it will be easier to bring 
about peace. Furthermore, it is known that people have nothing to separate and if they 
think rationally they will understand that it is a political game and governments 
generally are guilty of the most problematic situations. Nationalism was also one of 
their actions in order for governments to manipulate the people. 
 
3.3 Education 
In a case such as Cyprus where dual nationalism resides, the problems could not 
be omitted from education, especially the history education. Besides, the easiest route 
of fanaticism is through history and it occurs in both cases; Turkish-Cypriots and 
Greek-Cypriots. From the early years of the 20
th
 century, while Cyprus was a colonial 
outpost of the British, nationalism through education was strong.  
What Greek-Cypriots saw as a primordial inheritance, British administrators 
saw as the overt efforts of schoolteachers to “inflame the minds of the pupils against 
the other races resident on the island” as a directly political attempt to disturb the 
status quo (Bryant, 2004: 143). Nevertheless, Britain did not want to meddle with the 
education at least during that period. Although in 1935, the government had attempted 
to set intercommunal standards for education, hoping to quell the rising fervor of 
                                                             
24 “Πλο το οικοδόμθμα τθσ προπαγάνδασ μπορεί να γκρεμιςτεί ζτςι αυτόματα με μια ςυνάντθςθ και 
ζνα διάλογο. Τουλάχιςτον ςε άνκρωπο που είναι ζτοιμοσ να το δεχτεί”. 
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nationalism both by elimination of symbols and subjects of nationalist histories and 
by economic growth anticipated as a consequence of increased numbers of university 
graduates (Bryant, 2004: 160). As it can be assumed, their attempt had failed 
completely. The “de-Hellenization” became a rallying point and students revolted 
against it (Innes, 2008: 17). 
The “ethnic work” of education as Maratheftis has commented, during the 
British period it was simple: it was to instill in students the love of Greece and the 
desire of Enosis. And in this work the school had the cooperation of almost all the 
community, except for the few Anglophiles (Maratheftis, 1992). In this sense the new 
generation was affected to become more nationalist through education.  
However, it was not so difficult to raise the idea of Enosis to the students, as the 
analytical system was exactly the same as the Greek system. It has to be mentioned 
though, that they still studying from the same books. In addition to this, there was a 
motive to enhance the Greek consciousness at the schools so in every classroom there 
were symbols that would reflect to young Greek souls: the prohibition of Greek Maps 
which included Cyprus, pictures of the Greek royal family or other Greek 
personalities, the teaching of the Greek national anthem, the celebration of Greek 
independence day, the use of the Greek flag and the use generally of anything which 
use the blue and white colors of Greece (Bryant, 2004, Kiziyurek, 1999). Once 
someone had learned these things to be normal, it should not be a surprise that when 
EOKA‟s struggle started, the young generation was ready to fight for the Greek 
ideals. As Bryant argues: while their parents hesitated to join the fight, the young 
generation held no such qualm (2004: 156). There is no doubt that the new generation 
was the most powerful weapon in the hands of the EOKA. 
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After many years, things have still not changed. The educational system in the 
Republic of Cyprus remains almost the same. Even nowadays nationalism is very 
high if you observe all the surveys that have been done concerning this issue. It is 
clear that everyone in my focus groups realizes that the way that he/she was taught 
makes him/her a nationalistic. Specifically a member (Γ-R) stated: for instance about 
the 1821 battle, from the time you are in the kindergarten you participate in the 
performances of the battle, then you are in the elementary school and I still remember 
when there was the tree celebration day, where students plant trees, and at their 
speech during the tree celebration they ended the talk with a speech about the 
invasion. This was brainwashing. What about 1955-59? There are so many Greek-
Cypriot fighters but no one remember to refer to some of the Turkish-Cypriots who 
gave their help
25
. 
There is a necessity to publish and use the new Cypriot books. Most of the old 
ones have been printed after 1974 and as it can be assumed they were written in a way 
that shows the anger and the sorrow of Greek-Cypriots. The rewriting of the books 
and the beatification of history in a way that actually hides again the reality would be 
a wrong doing within the communities. The correct and objective illustration of the 
historical past of Cyprus, the recognition of wrong decisions from both sides but also 
the creation of a common identity for a hopeful future of the island are some of the 
elements that will help the new generation of Cyprus to live without the wrong 
decisions of their ancestors (Litsas: 9). 
                                                             
25 “για παράδειγμα το 1821, ξεκινάσ από το νθπιαγωγείο να κάνεισ αναπαραςτάςεισ, φτάνεισ ςτο 
δθμοτικό, ακόμθ κυμάμαι ςυγκεκριμζνο περιςτατικό που κάναμε τθ γιορτι του Δζντρου και ςτθ 
γιορτι του Δζντρου ζφταςαν να μασ μιλοφν για τθν ειςβολι. Είναι πλφςθ εγκεφάλου. 1955-1959. 
Ζχουμε τόςουσ Ελλθνοκφπριουσ ιρωεσ αλλά κανζνασ δεν κυμάται να αναφερκεί ότι υπιρχαν και 
Τουρκοκφπριοι που βοικθςαν”. 
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Simultaneously, as is reported in my research, there is the impression that if 
education is adjusted accordingly, all the Cypriots can live together harmoniously
26
. 
Similar phrases have been expressed like: “I believe that we can live together if we 
are educated without bias” and if for the next ten years we are educated correctly, it 
will be better in the long-term. 
As a survey presents in an elementary school, xenophobia and racism are the 
winners, according to the feelings of Greek-Cypriots for the foreigners in general. The 
results are impressing. 55.4% of the participants answered that nationality is a main 
criterion to create friendship with the other (Phileleutheros, 2 June 2010). When a 
country is so conservative and close-minded, these results are unavoidable. The 
changes on the pages of the history books do not mean that there will be a 
manipulation of the history. It will be an attempt to remove adjectives like “barbarian, 
gypsy and mucky” which do not need to be in the books. The ex-president of TRNC 
Talat noticed the necessity of changing the way history was portrayed regarding how 
the Cyprus issue was written in the history books. Similar efforts have been made in 
the North regarding their history books. 
Imagine a teacher getting into the classroom. It is early in the morning and he is 
saying: “my children, today is a special and unique day. It is a day that some years 
before we could not even imagine that from now on our country will be reunited… 
everything around us is changing: now we can talk about hope, cooperation, 
forgiveness and friendship instead of war, hate and revenge. The barbwire left behind 
and we have a democratic federal state. Do you know what that means? We have to 
                                                             
26 “ αν ρυκμιςτεί με τζτοιο τρόπο θ παιδεία νομίηω ότι μποροφμε να ηιςουμε αρμονικά”. 
 “κεωρϊ ότι με τθν ςωςτι παιδεία, μποροφμε να ηιςουμε μαηί”. 
“αν για τα επόμενα 10 χρόνια κάναμε ςωςτι εκπαιδευτικι κα ιταν πολφ καλφτερα”. 
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learn that everyone is a citizen of the reunited federal country (Trimikliniotis, 31 
January 2010: 13).    
When there is “hope” and “fantasy” there is also the strength to change the 
situation and which pushes forward the history of the island (Trimikliniotis, 31 
January 2010: 13). Now the only part that is left is the citizens of the island having to 
accept a solution like this, because, as many attempts will be done, without an 
effective participation from the people, nothing can be changed.  
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Chapter 4 
The Annan Plan 
The Annan Plan was the first comprehensive approach to treating almost all 
aspects of life in the proposed Bi-zonal and Bi-communal Cyprus. It was named in 
recognition of the person who actually devised the plan, the UN Secretary-General, 
Kofi Annan.  
Although the Annan Plan was first submitted in November 2002 as a “basis for 
an agreement on a comprehensive settlement”, it had been revised several times. The 
final version of the plan was presented to both communities on 31
st
 of March 2004, in 
Bürgenstock, Switzerland.   
On 24
th
 April, a referendum had been held in Cyprus over the plan for the 
reunification of the island. The new country was to be a federation of the two 
communities. Unfortunately, the Annan Plan had been rejected by the overwhelming 
majority of Greek-Cypriots. The Turkish-Cypriots, in contrast, accepted the plan by a 
majority of 64%.  
The following text firstly will analyze the real meaning of the terms Bi-
communal, Bi-zonal Federation but also how that the members of the focus groups 
perceived this terminology. Then, the explanation of the main factors of the rejection 
of the Annan Plan is followed as the participants of my focus groups agreed to. In the 
end, there is a particular section describing what were the reasons that Greek-Cypriot 
voted “No” to the Annan Plan.  
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4.1   The meaning of the terms Bi-communal, Bi-zonal Federation 
In order to understand the idea of the Annan Plan, the meaning must be clarified 
of the three terms of which the articles of the plan were based. Unfortunately a clear 
meaning of those three words arose after the Annan Plan (a female of the interviewed 
groups (E-OG) stated that the Bi-communal, Bi-zonal Federation is just one term: you 
have to use these words together always). Even if there was an intention to explain 
these words, there was not enough time and the politicians preferred not to spend time 
to explain them, as a result the Cypriots were kept in the dark. 
Returning to the definitions, it has to be illustrated that there is a literal and a 
political meaning of the words. It appears that sometimes these words come to mean 
something different to the original meaning. So, when you are checking the words in 
the dictionary (Pampiniotis, 1998 ed.): 
- Bi-communal: it consists of two communities. 
- Bi-zonal: it consists of two (geographical) zones or intends the existence 
of two zones. 
- Federation: the unification of more than one, independent and autonomous 
states in order to create a single statehood, international personality and to 
have a common constitution and internal law. 
The new President Christofias in collaboration with PIO published a document 
with a title “Cyprus and the federation” (Public Information Office, 2010). A lot of 
people have criticized it negatively but it should not be overlooked that it was the first 
attempt to inform people officially. According to this document the term bi-communal 
as it is, also determined by the UN, means that both communities will participate 
efficiently at the political institutions and at the decisions of the central authority. This 
is not a new definition, as exactly the same term was written at the 1960‟s constitution 
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of Cyprus. Now, the only part that is missing is to what extent they will participate. 
With concern to the term bi-zonal, it is obvious that there will be two different areas 
with Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot administration respectively. Every state of 
the federation will be run from the respective community.  
However, the first two words were the easy part. The big problem starts from 
the meaning of federation and what kind of federation will be functional in Cyprus. A 
federal state is a composite state which consists of at least two districts and each state 
has its own self dominating (legislation, executive, assembly) and they act directly 
under the jurisdiction which is conceded by the constitution. Some basics 
characteristics are that the sovereign state is only the central power and it is the only 
one which will be recognized internationally. Moreover, there is a distinction between 
the jurisdiction of the state and the two zonal communities.  
It has to be clarified that there is a huge argument about the time that the bi-
zonal, bi-communal federation was accepted as a base for a solution. In 1977 Denktas 
and Makarios agreed that all negotiations will be based on four general principles 
(Dodd, 2002: 24):  
1] We are seeking an independent, non-aligned, bi-communal Federal 
Republic. 
2] The territory under the administration of each community should be 
discussed in the light of economic viability or productivity and land ownership. 
3] Questions of principles (sic) like freedom of movement, freedom of 
settlement, the right of property and other specific matters, are open for 
discussion taking into consideration the fundamental basis of a bi-communal 
federal system and certain difficulties which may arise for the Turkish Cypriot 
community. 
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4] The powers and functions of the central federal government will be such as 
to safeguard the unity of the country, having regard for the bi-communal 
character of the State. 
 Few people argue about the existence and the truth within that document. But, 
because no one knows, I will take as given what most of the history books have 
written. The unique agreement of Makarios and Denktas in 1977 illustrated the bi-
communal federation. The argument comes with the explanation of bi-zonal. They did 
not exactly use the word bi-zonal, but, if someone analyzes the second and fourth 
paragraph, he will realize the meaning of bi-zonal. Although the correct question is if 
the bi-zonal, bi-communal federation was signed more than 30 years ago, why 
Cypriots and especially Greek-Cypriots argue about it and why they did not start the 
negotiations based on that high-level agreement of 1977?  
In my own research, the answers about the knowledge of the terms are not 
satisfying. Most of my participants in the focus groups did not know anything about 
the terms, or even if they understood some points, they did not care for this resolution. 
Actually, one of my informants (H-OG) pointed out that neither of the people who are 
using these terms has understood the exact plan
27
. These expressions were repeated 
time and again; 1) “I do not even know if all I have told you is correct28” and 2) “I 
have heard these words before but I did not understand their exact meaning
29”. It is 
not a coincidence that all the other surveys have the same findings with mine.  
Nevertheless, the people from the focus groups who were more informed than 
the others tried to explain in their words what bi-zonal and bi-communal meant and 
                                                             
27 “οφτε καν εκείνοι που το χρθςιμοποιοφν δεν ξζρουν τί είναι”. 
28 “δεν ξζρω κι αν αυτό που είπα είναι καν ςωςτό”. 
29 “Ζχω ξανακοφςει αυτζσ τισ λζξεισ αλλά δεν ζχω ελζγξει τθν ακριβι τουσ ζννοια”. 
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also to explain federation. The ugly truth is that even if they tried to do that, when I 
was trying to clarify their answer and asking them something more specific they got 
confused and they were unable to distinguish the differences. For instance, a lot of 
times the participants told me two different zones and two different communities. 
When it was asked what was the difference they could not understand the difference 
of zones and communities. They did not even understand the difference between 
federation and confederation and which of these two will take place in Cyprus. 
Another important issue is that many times people from my focus groups 
complained that after so many years they have become tired from the Cyprus dispute 
so they stopped researching anything related to the problem. It is really unacceptable 
when young people use expressions such as this. Youth is supposedly the new 
generation of the country that will eventually form the future.  
Instead of this, in “Can the Cyprus problem be resolved” Survey the “18-24 
age” group tend to “I know the plan a little” or “I do not know the plan at all”. 
Moreover, it is very impressive that all the Greek-Cypriots, of every age, do not want 
to have a solution such as this. I do not know if it is due to the fact that most of them 
do not know anything about the subject but the results still remain impressive. In a 
general survey of the organization “Cyprus 2015” results show that Greek-Cypriots 
do not reject the federation however nor do they accept it. The survey about “Youth in 
Cyprus” published by University of Lefkosia in co-operation with KADEM, gives 
you an idea about the political situation within a Cypriots‟ mind. Only 6% supported 
that the best solution for Cyprus is to become a federation.  
As it was referred in another survey published by the newspaper Simerini, most 
of the citizens of Cyprus declare that they do not know how a bi-zonal, bi-communal 
federation can function in Cyprus. Even if there was an endeavor to try explaining the 
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terms, they do not know how it will eventually work. This result points out the failure 
of the government and the political parties to inform and enlighten what it is exactly 
instead of declarations and more conversations about the reason why they have to 
support it (Ploutarxos, 15 November 2009: 2). The lack of good information could 
explain a satisfactory percentage of this rejection. As another informant from the 
group of non refugees‟ parents stated that the result of 76% rejection also has 
something to do with the plan as a plan and not because of the ignorance of the 
people
30
.  
In conclusion, there is great confusion about everything; that Greek-Cypriots 
know regarding the solution, whether the terms are clear in their minds and if they 
know what they really want. With everything such a mess, how could the Annan Plan 
possibly be accepted? 
 
4.2 .1   The predictable results 
After six years from the strong “No” of Greek-Cypriots to the Annan-Plan, it is 
certain that a combination of a lot of reasons was responsible for this rejection.  As it 
was analyzed above, the ignorance and the unwillingness towards the plan was strong 
enough to make people turn down the attempts of the UN. But the Greek-Cypriot 
political parties could not stay without responsibility for the Annan Plan because it 
might be the main reason for the rejection.  
A young male (A-NR) quoted that if someone observes the Annan Plan‟s result, 
with a more rational perspective, is like mathematics: if you sum up each party‟s 
percentages then you will get the 76%. “The president whose party is 15% said No, 
                                                             
30 “είναι δυνατό να υπιρχε 76% μόνο που τθ πλθροφόρθςθ που το αρνικθκαν? Ρρζπει να υπιρχαν 
κάποια λάκοσ ςτοιχεία ςτο ςχζδιο”. 
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AKEL with 30% also supported No, then EDEK with 10% and if you count also some 
people from DISI who did not follow the “Yes” of their party then…31”. 
However it is better that the political parties‟ decision about the Annan Plan is 
analyzed step by step. What was the reason that they finally decided to reject the 
plan? There was big interest also in the background stories and the explanation of 
each party about their decisions. It has to be clarified that the speech of Tassos 
Papadopoulos, President of Cyprus at that time, was to be analyzed below in a 
different sub-chapter.  
So, let‟s start from AKEL which actually is the most interesting because of the 
last moment shift in their decision. In the beginning there was a tendency to vote 
“Yes” in the Annan Plan. But after the speech of Tassos Papadopoulos, the current 
president and after a two day meeting, they published some points which should be 
accepted from the Political Office on 14
th
 of April 2004. Some of them totally 
disagreed with the President‟s speech and that the Annan plan had also positive 
elements which in due course were to promise peaceful existence of the communities. 
Nevertheless, in the end, they wanted to postpone the referendum for some months in 
order to present the Annan Plan in a better way otherwise they would not support the 
approval of the plan (Perikleous, 2007: 607-608). There is no need for someone to 
read it twice in order to value that in this document the last paragraph actually 
reverses all those proceeding it. As was written in Phileleutheros newspaper Turkey 
had an additional reason to reject the postponement of the plan because it seemed it 
                                                             
31 “είπε ο Ρρόεδροσ που το κόμμα του είχε το 15% όχι. Είπε το ΑΚΕΛ που το κόμμα του είχε το 30%. Η 
ΕΔΕΚ που είχε το 10%, κι ο Συναγερμόσ (ΔΗΣΥ) παρόλο που είπε Ναι είδεσ ζνα μεγάλο ποςοςτό του 
να υποςτθρίηει το Πχι” 
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was in its own interest if Greek-Cypriots in the end say “No” (Stulianou, 14 April 
2004).  
The elections were on the way and Christofias could not ignore the negative 
tendency of leftists but also Greek-Cypriots in general. In order to prepare Greek-
Cypriots about his political party‟s shift, he started declaring that the aim of the 
postponement was to succeed with better conditions of the plan. In the end, AKEL 
announced its negative decision. Although as Christofias said: “We are saying “No” 
now because in the end we want to give a “cementate” Yes”. The importance of this 
phrase is shown from the fact that it was referred verbatim by one of my participants 
(A-F).  
The intentions of the other political parties were less interesting as they decided 
from the beginning what they wanted to vote and they remained stable in their views. 
EDEK, the socialist party followed AKEL‟s way. The president of the political party, 
Giannakis Omirou, wanted to support “Yes” to the Annan Plan but the founder and 
ex-president of the party Vasos Lissaridis insisted to reject the plan. During that hat 
period the European socialist parties tried to advice Giannaki Omirou by saying “Yes” 
to the plan is the correct solution. As Mrs. Rote said, now that there is a real 
possibility for a solution, try to take advantage of this opportunity (Taramounta, 8 
April 2004). Unfortunately, in the end, Giannakis Omirou could not disregard 
Lussaridis‟ alienated opinion. He stayed faithful to the shadow of his political party‟s 
founder (Perikleous, 2007: 621). 
Concerning the DIKO, the political party of that time, there is no reason to 
examine it further at the moment as there will be a special sub-chapter about its 
leader‟s decisions below. As was expected the members of the party followed their 
leaders and president of the Republic of Cyprus‟ decisions.  
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Other small political parties like NEO, Ecologists and ADIK without any 
hesitation supported “No” and followed the president‟s decision. Analytically, NEO 
relied upon its national and anti-federation positions; it was not so difficult to say 
“No” to the Annan Plan unanimously. Ecologists reject the Anan Plan from the 
beginning and not even for a second did they change their minds. That was a disaster 
for their party as the other European Ecologists believed that “No” was a nationalistic 
position, so the Cypriot party was alienated from other Ecologists in the European 
parliament. Regarding ADIK, without any political or ideological background it stood 
with the “No” camp. 
The only parties that supported “Yes” were DISI and EDI. DISI is a right party, 
which actually is the second biggest political party in Cyprus. Nikos Anastasiadis, the 
leader of the party, had to face up to the rejection tendency in its own party. Glaukos 
Klerides, founder of the rally and ex-president of Cyprus, determined his opinion and 
made the people of his party understand that the Annan Plan is a solution, with 
disadvantages but, it can function if there is a political will (Phileleutheros 8 April 
2004). Similarly, Nikos Anastasiadis, the President of the party, ignored the political 
cost of his decision, but also with the support of Klerides, he chose to vote “Yes” to 
the Annan Plan. As was predictable, the 77,6% of the DISI‟s members supported his 
decision. Unfortunately this percentage was not so clear to the people so DISI was 
split within the referendum and after the referendum a lot of people seceded from the 
party. Similarly EDI, the small party of ex-president Giorgos Vasiliou, arranged itself 
within the “Yes” camp. In Vasiliou‟s view, the Annan Plan was not the ideal; it had 
weaknesses but it led to the reunification of the island. “No” meant extension of the 
status quo and a possibility for a dichotomy (Phileleutheros 8 April 2004). 
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The point is that no one was surprised with the 76% voting down the Annan 
Plan; no one could predict that every three of four -Greek-Cypriots would vote “No”. 
The rejection was certain. Once again most of the political parties preferred to follow 
the president‟s decision and also to avoid any political cost during the situation. It was 
the safest solution for them. DISI has to be congratulated as it was the only one from 
the four biggest parties in Cyprus, which did not consider the reaction and the 
political cost.  
 
4.2.2  Tassos Papadopoulos‟ speech 
“Greek Cypriot People 
I took over a state internationally recognized. I will not give back a “community” 
without the right to speak internationally and searching for a guardian
32” 
 
In my research, all the informants in the focus groups agreed that President 
Papadopoulos‟ speech was one of the main reasons that Greek-Cypriots rejected the 
plan. As it seems, Tassos Papadopoulos, with or without intention, manipulated public 
opinion. This sub-chapter would not be examined if “No” was the correct or incorrect 
answer to the plan, but how his speech affected Greek-Cypriots opinion. Certainly his 
speech was fuelled by emotion. He knew that by using words and expressions which 
could reflect upon everyone‟s heart, he would mislead their opinions and achieve the 
results that he so desired.  From the beginning Tassos Papadopoulos was against the 
plan because of his perception of politics. It is a fact that the ex-president had rejected 
all the plans from 1959 (Drousiotis, 10 April 2004: 2). The only plan he had accepted 
                                                             
32 Ραρζλαβα Κράτοσ διεκνϊσ αναγνωριςμζνο. Δεν κα παραδϊςω «κοινότθτα» χωρίσ δικαίωμα λόγου 
διεκνϊσ και ςε αναηιτθςθ κθδεμόνα. 
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was to negotiate the Annan plan and as it appeared it was not an honest response as 
was obvious from his speech. 
During the speech, Papadopoulos illustrated only the negative points of the 
Plan. As he said: “it is not the right time to analyze the Annan Plan” (RIK 7 April 
2004). Unfortunately Papadopoulos‟ words were unacceptable to say the least. He 
described the “United Republic of Cyprus” as the worst thing that could happen. But 
if it was so bad, what was he thinking when he was negotiating the plan? 
The main problem throughout was not only the inaccurate things that he said 
during his speech. The worst part was in the last minutes of the speech whilst crying; 
he was trying to convince everyone to reject the plan. It is believed that he truly felt 
the responsibility of his actions and its consequences until all the other parties 
supported “Yes” but the tears cannot go unmentioned. In my opinion, the 
accompanying tears were used to “impress”, to make Greek-Cypriots disapprove the 
whole situation. The result was the prospective; after Papadopoulos‟ speech some of 
the political parties changed their idea about it and they decided to follow the 
president‟s point of view. Besides it was thought that President Papadopoulos was the 
most qualified regarding the Annan Plan as he was the negotiator. So in the end, he 
affected the political parties, the way he affected his people. His mission was 
completed successfully! 
 
4.2.3 Mass Media  
Certainly mass media has been the main informant regarding the Annan Plan. 
Media undoubtedly manipulated Cypriots minds and specifically the journalists had 
been divided into two categories: the one which preferred to say “Yes” to the Annan 
Plan and the few who were against it.  
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One of the problems was as the President Papadopoulos named: “the case of the 
ambient atmosphere”. He accused some people of taking a lot of money from the 
USA in order to support the Annan plan. After the plan there was a big argument 
about it. Why did Cypriots accept money from USA? Why USA gave money and so 
on. Eventually it became the extension of nationalism, but this time with a different 
name. Journalists, political analysts and professors from Cypriot Universities 
supported the Annan Plan fanatically but their attempts did not convince Cypriots to 
follow their opinion. They were trying to inspire ordinary people about the 
advantages, taking as allies the Anglo-Americans. As Americans admit that no matter 
how much money they gave, they failed to promote that which the people of Cyprus 
did not want (Drousiotis, 11 November 2005: 37). After the strong “No” of 76%, they 
did not give up. They are continuing to try to convince Cypriots about the good 
intentions of Anglo-Americans regarding the solution to the Cyprus problem (Tzioni, 
21 August 2009: 10). 
According to my findings, one of my participants (A-F) stated that when 
someone was reading Phileleutheros newspaper, there was propaganda over “No”, 
and when some other was reading Politis newspaper there was propaganda to say 
“Yes”.33 Also it was reported by a male (H-OG) that everyone was saying whatever 
he liked in that “stupid box” that we call a TV. Perhaps it was not a good decision to 
televise the Annan Plan. Various politicians were behaving like actors and they were 
giving their performances without correct knowledge of the situation and they also 
                                                             
33 “διάβαηεσ Φιλελεφκερο ζκανε προπαγάνδα υπζρ του Πχι, διάβαηεσ Ρολίτθ, προπαγάνδα υπζρ του 
Ναι”. 
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were disagreeing with each other and between their parties.
34
 Throughout that period 
some of the television channels were trying to illustrate the opinion of a minority as a 
majority‟s opinion. As one of the older informants of the groups stated  
Media has become the 4
th
 power of any country. It can be useful to a point but 
during that time, it proved to be ill-informed. As Chalikiopoulos found on the 
internet: “from the time that TV became a mean of massive persuasion, there is no 
need for a dictatorship” (Chalikiopoulos, 12 July 2010: 13). All journalists cannot be 
blamed. Some of them still continue with their job trying to do their best to inform the 
people. But as Media becomes such a powerful weapon, journalists must double 
check their information before it can be officially released. 
These days, there are new efforts towards a solution between the two 
communities. It is a fact that now it is more difficult than 2004. Nevertheless, the two 
communities still cooperate. UN reported that for the first time in history, there is an 
honest political endeavor from both sides. Instead of this, media refers to crisis, 
dispute, and the worst scenario is that they buried the new plan even before it had 
started (Drousiotis, 7 May 2008). When Media acts like this, then the new plan before 
birth has been rejected!  
There is no time to terrify Cypriots. Media (and the people behind media) have 
to realize their true power and start using it in order to find a solution instead of only 
taking interest in some “big” people who prefer Cyprus to continue to be divided 
concerning the Annan Plan. Cypriots do not pay attention to the media anymore. After 
the accusation during an ambient atmosphere from the President of Cyprus, there is no 
                                                             
34 “ο κακζνασ ζλεγε ότι ικελε ςτο χαηοκοφτι που το λζνε τθλεόραςθ. Είναι ο πιο λάκοσ τρόποσ να 
μεταδοκεί το ςχζδιο Ανάν. Ριγαιναν όπωσ τουσ θκοποιοφσ διάφοροι πολιτικοί και ζκαναν τθν δικι 
τουσ παράςταςθ χωρίσ να γνωρίηουν. Διαφωνοφςαν όλοι μεταξφ τουσ και μεταξφ των κομμάτων”. 
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credible sign remaining for the current media powers. If the citizens take seriously 
what they hear from the politicians and the media, one way leads to desperation and 
the other to the disappearance of a focused community looking towards the future 
(Dionusiou, 4 October 2009: 3). 
 
4.3 Greek-Cypriot Rejection 
As it referred in the introduction, over 75% of the population of the Republic of 
Cyprus rejected the plan. In order to understand this massive rejection (almost three of 
four Greek-Cypriots), the reason must be analyzed why the Greek-Cypriots decided to 
vote “No” to the Annan Plan. 
 It is difficult to explain Cypriot reaction because after the gallop poll, it seemed 
that they were not too honest about their vote. According to the results of that gallop 
poll, 75% voted “No” because the Annan Plan did not assure Cypriot‟s safety. 
Another 5% voted “No” considering the economical cost after the plan, 7% was 
influenced from Tassos Papadopoulos‟ speech and 13% prefer to live separately with 
Turkish-Cypriots (Perikleous, 2007: 658). There are too many doubts about the 
outcome of this gallop poll, because if the only problem was the guaranteed security 
of Cyprus that meant that the districts next to the crossing-points or near the “Green 
Line” would have voted “No” to the Annan plan. Instead of this, the areas near the 
internal “borders” seem that they were supporters of “Yes”. So, it seems that Greek-
Cypriots did not admit at the gallop polls what the real reason of their rejection was.  
They were trying to give the impression that they arrived at their decisions by 
themselves and that was the motive of their vote.  
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The Annan plan was bringing about big questions to Greek-Cypriot‟s mind. No 
explanation was ever given regarding at least the important articles of the plan. As ex-
president Clerides said: “the plan has some points that we do not like but at least we 
know what is about. If we will say “No” we will be at the escarpment from where we 
do not know its depth” (Poludoras, Paraschos, March 2010).  
But did the Greek-Cypriots say “No” to the Annan Plan or to the co-existence 
with Turkish-Cypriots? This is a crucial question because if Greek-Cypriots said “No” 
to the content of the Annan Plan, it means that there is the intention for reconciliation. 
Otherwise, if they had voted “No” because they do not believe that they can live 
together harmoniously, then there is no point trying to negotiate anything in order to 
succeed a better agreement with Turkish-Cypriots. In addition, if Greek-Cypriots 
knew why they voted “No”, then it would be pointless to hope that with more time or 
with more analysis of the Plan their vote would change into a “Yes”. 
At my focus groups, everyone agreed that the UN Plan was a complex and 
multi-faceted legal document. Although, a male (E-F) admitted that if the groundwork 
of a system is complicated then there will be potential problems as well
35
.  The size of 
the Plan (more than 9,000 pages) could not ensure the functionality that could be 
presented to the plan. People were not naive. They realized that this plan would cause 
a lot of reactions. Under this situation, it is rational for Greek-Cypriots to avoid 
getting into trouble. 
Choleras has analyzed Greek-Cypriots‟ reaction better. According to his 
research Greek-Cypriot‟s mass rejection based on four main reasons (2004): 
                                                             
35 “Πταν θ βάςθ πολιτεφματοσ είναι πολφπλοκθ τότε μπορεί να υπάρχουν και πικανά προβλιματα”. 
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1) The distrust with Turkey. The benefits accepting the plan would be 
materialized only if Turkey wanted to show goodwill. No one could guarantee 
to Greek-Cypriots that Turkey would keep to that agreement. 
2) Economical reasons. According to the Annan Plan Greek-Cypriots would pay 
for the development in the North. That directly means Greek-Cypriots will 
pay (literally) the sequence of the military intervention/invasion.  
3) The disability of the supporters of the Plan to convince Greek-Cypriots. 
Despite all of their endeavors, in the end, they just threaten people about what 
will happen if they do not vote “Yes”. In particular, Kasoulides, a famous 
politician of DISI and an extreme supporter of the Annan Plan was 
threatening that if Greek-Cypriots reject the plan, an Asia Minor Catastrophe 
will eventuate. 
4) Self-preserving instinct of Greek-Cypriots. It is a power that cannot be 
explained. The experiences, the struggles, the resistances but also an 
admirable survival are part of their lives and all together compose the 
“magic” of their characters.   
The truth lies somewhere between the reasons that have been described above. 
Certainly, the awareness and the size of the Plan were quite enough to make the 
Greek-Cypriots to reject it. Moreover, the fact that the accession of the Republic of 
Cyprus in the EU was one week after the referendum, made their decision easier as it 
was believed that Cyprus could claim a better agreement when it is full member of the 
EU. 
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Chapter 5 
Prospects of reconciliation 
In 1974, after the military intervention/invasion from Turkey onto the island, Cyprus 
was divided into two parts: the northern where Turkish-Cypriots live and to the south, the 
Republic of Cyprus. For more than 30 years politicians from different parties and the 
leaders of the communities have been trying to find a solution which will be fair for both 
sides. 
Various factors led to this deadlock. The problem is that after so many years, people 
stop being interested in any kind of a solution. They got used to the present situation 
somehow and they do not care to change anything that will help the two communities live 
together. And here is the crucial question: Do Cypriots still want to find a solution? As my 
thesis is based on the young generation‟s opinion I will focus on the problem under this 
perception. The young generation wants a change in life for a better future or do they prefer 
the whole situation as it is right now? To check if there is an intention for a solution, it has 
to be analyzed via different factors about Cyprus. If someone wants to understand the 
underlying logic, s/he has to read between the lines. No one will say directly what is going 
on and how it can be resolved. Also no one political will admit something that will cause 
detriment to his career and to his life overall. 
If the new solution can skip this problem, then there is a small chance for Cypriots to 
realize the best solution for their own country. People have to decide immediately because 
this inactivity is detrimental to all of us and especially the young people who will be forced 
to accept a situation in which they were never involved. 
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This chapter is based on four main parameters, as they were perceived in the focus 
groups: the politicians and their political games, the factor of time, the situation of the 
Greek-Cypriots after the results of the military intervention/invasion and finally, the 
accession of Cyprus to the EU. 
 
5.1 .1   The role of leadership 
Z-F: “Denktas is the most charismatic leader in Cyprus”36. 
A-F: “Cypriot is too weak to diverge from his/her political house” 37. 
Θ-NR: “We are the future and I believe that we must make our decisions by 
ourselves. We have to find out if our party still represents our ideology and not if 
our ideology falls into the party’s ideology”. 38 
 
The political parties and the President of a country determine the political arena. 
Without a comprehensible picture of their duty but also their responsibility, it is too 
difficult to bring about the expected results. The mistakes are unavoidable without a clear 
target regarding the interests of the country. According to the politician‟s behavior, the fate 
of a nation is endangered so any offhandedness is not allowed.
39
 It is tragic however, 
throughout the Cyprus issue that the same politicians from „60s remain in charge of 
                                                             
36 “Ο Ντενκτάσ είναι ο πιο χαριςματικόσ θγζτθσ ςτθν Κφπρο”. 
37 “Ο Κφπριοσ είναι πολφ αδφναμοσ να αποκλίνει τθσ κομματικισ του ςτζγθσ”. 
38 “Εμείσ που είμαςτε το μζλλον πιςτεφω ότι πρζπει να παίρνουμε τισ αποφάςεισ μασ μόνοι μασ και 
να δοφμε κατά πόςο το κόμμα πλζον είναι ςτισ ιδεολογίεσ τισ δικζσ μασ και όχι εμείσ αν είμαςτε ςτισ 
ιδεολογίεσ του κόμματοσ”. 
39 Vasos, Lissarides, “Των οικιϊν θμϊν εμπιπραμζνων…”, Simerini, 22 February 2004. 
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Cyprus. When will Greek-Cypriots realize that there is a necessity for new people to get 
involved in politics? 
According to Mauratsas, necessary changes and reforms can be expected only 
through the actions of some charismatic leaders who will not hesitate to oppose and 
eventually to defeat the mentality at a political cost (1998: 208). President Christofias, 
following the same path of his predecessors, has never dared to escape from the attitude of 
the “nice guy” towards the Great Powers and Turkey as well. He did not estimate the 
situation as he should have and in the end he made one-sided withdrawals -the acceptance 
of 50.000 settlers and the rotating presidency- 
40
 in order to prove to the world that there is 
a will to resolve the Cyprus question, expecting Talat to do the same. However, Talat never 
offered anything such as Christofias‟ “gift”.  
In my research, the results from the focus groups illustrated that this charismatic 
Greek-Cypriot leader has not yet been found. Actually, when the participants were asked 
for their opinion about the leaders in Cyprus, their answer was impressing, as most of them 
agreed with the Z-F‟s statement above. Denktas seems to be the most skillful politician in 
Cyprus. Furthermore, it appears that the youth (except those from the left party) at the 
focus groups believes that president Christofias cannot change too many things as the 
leaders from both communities are just “puppets”41 who are trying to satisfy the biggest 
interests in general. Nevertheless, concerning the negotiations and the possibility of a 
solution, Christofias‟ handling is accepted from the majority of Greek-Cypriots, 54%42 
(Ploutarxos, 2009). The same results were released after the “Cyprus 2015” survey.  
                                                             
40 Savvas, Iakovides, “Από τουσ ευςεβείσ πόκουσ ςτθν διάψευςθ των μφκων”, Apopsi, March 2010. 
41 This characterization was given by some of my informants from different focus groups. 
42  Giorgos, Ploutarxos, “Οι πολίτεσ απορρίπτουν τθ διηωνικι, δικοινοτικι ομοςπονδία”, Simerini, 15 
November 2009. 
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As my focus groups‟ participants illustrated, a lot of Greek-Cypriots were waiting 
their political party‟s position with the plan, in order to decide what they really wanted. As 
A-F declared above, Cypriots always vote the same political party no matter what. They do 
not have the power to judge their political party‟s actions. If they cannot vote what is the 
best for their country, then Cypriots have to stop complaining about their future.  
Under these circumstances, politicians must realize that their position is both a wish 
and a curse simultaneously. It is like a bomb in their hands, which can bring disaster after a 
small mistake. They must follow the direction which can raise new opportunities to the 
Cyprus dispute. This can be achieved if present politicians recognized their wrong 
diplomacy, take all the responsibility and retire from politics. 
According to Charalampous, Turks seem to know exactly what they really want and 
they claim it in any way, unlike Greek-Cypriots who agree on other things, they want to 
mean something else and in the end they negotiate for something completely different. 
After so many years, they have no idea what they really want. They have been trained to 
say all the time that they want a solution, like parrots, thinking that they hide their real 
desire which is partition
43
. Instead of trying to find a solution, Greek-Cypriots are rejecting 
any kind of a plan as they do not know what they want and what can satisfy them. Asking 
partition as a solution is the proof of Greek-Cypriots‟ disappointment. A survey shows that 
the majority of the latter recommend solutions which do not seem to be supported from any 
political party since the politicians do not know what kind of a solution they seek 
(Ploutarchos, 2009).  
Another important issue is the “Plan B” in both communities‟ agenda. If you compare 
them, then it is not too difficult to understand that Turkey had thought the possibility that 
                                                             
43 Loukas, Charalampous, “Η διχοτόμθςθ που βολεφει”, Politis, 4 October 2009. 
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negotiations would fail again so they were prepared for any developments concerning 
Cyprus. The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hüseyin Özgürgün sustained that the Turkish-
Cypriots will not negotiate forever. They will seek the recognition of TRNC in turn.
44
  
On the other hand the Greek-Cypriot leaders did not realize that they had to discover 
a “Plan B” just in case. According to a statement of President Christofias one month ago, 
he said that there is only one scenario, only a “Plan A” and this is the solution of the 
Cyprus problem. Nevertheless, all the other parties warn the president; there is a necessity 
of a “Plan B”. What must happen in order for President Christofias to realize that his policy 
is out of reach? As Anastasiadis pronounced “when you notice the tail of a snake, you do 
not need to see the whole of it to understand that sometime you run a risk of the 
consequences because of your disregard.
45
 
It has to be a clear direction for what they want in order to get people to support it. It 
is incumbent upon the cooperation of AKEL and DISI. They have to tell the truth to the 
Greek-Cypriots, they have to explain what Bi-zonal, and Bi-communal Federation means 
and generally they have to prepare them for accepting the co-existence with Turkish-
Cypriots. Otherwise, they are also abetting the failure of the new settlement.
46
 The same 
idea was supported by a participant from the “Leftist” focus group. If at least the two 
biggest political parties agree about the kind of the solution that they want, then they would 
convince people. If they do not agree, they will divide their voters and ultimately Greek-
Cypriots will say “No” again to the next plan.  The leaders and also their supporters must 
raise a “federal atmosphere”. They have to learn how to act as a nation with common 
interest and fight for the same target. 
                                                             
44 Anna, Andreou, “Αποκαλυπτικόσ ο ΥΡΕΞ για τισ προκζςεισ τθσ Τ/κ πλευράσ”, Politis, 23 May 2009. 
45 APE, “Αναςταςιάδθσ: τα ΗΕ ζχουν ςχζδιο Β για το Κυπριακό?”, Simerini, 21 June 2010. 
46 Loizos, Paphitis, “Τϊρα μποροφμε να ελπίηουμε?”, Politis, 30 May 2010. 
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It is observed from the focus groups that a large proportion of the new generations 
remain faithful to their political party. When some critical questions were asked, they had 
given the expected answers that their parties supported. In a small country such as Cyprus, 
sometimes to follow their party‟s decisions is unavoidable. The solution is behind the 
words of the Θ-NR‟s statement above; Cypriots have to change mentality and start voting 
the politicians who will work for the best of their country and not for their own. The phrase 
of Θ-NR describes perfectly what must be changed in politics. If people stop following 
their political party‟s opinion when they do not agree, then the political parties will get the 
point and they will try to recall their ideology. When people realize it as soon as possible, 
then politics will be changed for the better. 
 
 
5.1.2 The fear of political parties 
Z-F: “There is not any person who will take this responsibility because he will 
be characterized as a traitor” 47. 
B-OG: “Politicians, who dare to change something, cannot win the elections 
easily after that” 48. 
If the citizens of a country (i.e. Cyprus) do not know what they want, their politicians 
are even worse since sometimes they maintain opposite opinions from their offered 
persuasions. The political cost of any kind of a solution will be vast. Specifically, the 
Greek-Cypriot politicians cannot risk their career concerning the Cyprus question as they 
will be responsible for the consequences.  
                                                             
47 “Δεν υπάρχει άνκρωποσ” που κα το πάρει πάνω του γιατί κα χαρακτθριςτεί προδότθσ”. 
48 “Ρολιτικοί που τολμοφν δεν κερδίηουν εφκολα εκλογζσ”. 
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In my research, the comments made by the participants are really interesting. As the 
young male‟s (Z-F) statement above, it is difficult for a politician to take this crucial 
decision by himself as he might be characterized as a traitor. Also, another issue which 
raised by the B-OG‟s declaration above, is that politicians realize the real dimension of the 
consequences to their career, if in the end they will set up a plan that the citizens of the 
Republic of Cyprus are not ready to accept. If a politician decides to choose the best for his 
own country (which means changing tactic regarding the solution), maybe it is too risky, if 
he is interested to win the elections and being active member to politics as well. 
It is decided that every time a solution must be given to both communities at a 
referendum simultaneously. At least under these circumstances, the political leaders will 
not take the responsibility of the solution and at the same time they will blame the citizens 
of Cyprus for the result. In fact, it is easier to share the responsibility of the referendum, 
instead of being a brave politician and making radical decisions. For instance, AKEL was 
in favor of “Yes” to the Annan Plan in the beginning. However, when it was in danger of 
losing its supporters because of its vote, it changed its view 180 degrees and in the end its 
final answer was “No” with the excuse “We are saying “No” now in order to straighten out 
the future for a “Yes” vote”. 
A solution (any solution) will have the proportional results. Unfortunately politicians 
are afraid of the political cost so they prefer to stay as they are, without any change. As it is 
referred also above, a “charismatic” leader is the one who can enforce his opinion and 
convince the people to trust him about his decisions. He is the one who will act as a good 
politician and decide the future of Cyprus without thinking of the political cost.  
President Christofias was called the “President of the solution”. People believed to 
his power and voted for him in 2008. The shock will be huge for AKEL after the collapse 
of the political consensus in federation of which he was the biggest supporter for years 
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(Perikleous, May 2010). He does not have the will but also he is not brave enough to make 
decisions and to give a new vision to the Greek-Cypriots. Contrary to this, he is 
continuously saying that if he will not resolve the Cyprus dispute he will not run as a 
candidate for the next elections in 2013. No one cares about the elections and the truth is 
that no one asked him what will happen to his political career until 2013. Politicians must 
understand that it does not make any difference to the population who will be in charge. 
After 40 years of the establishment of Republic of Cyprus, all the big political parties had a 
president of their own party at least once. Now, there is no excuse from any party about 
their actions. It is obvious that the fear of the political cost is stronger than the desire of 
finding a solution. When politicians stop acting in their own interests, the Cyprus issue will 
be easier to be resolved. 
 
 
5.1.3 Eroglu instead of Talat 
“It is like we return to the model of Denktas; we hate him but he was clearly an 
enemy. With Talat, it was somehow ambiguous” 49. 
“If Eroglu wins the elections, dichotomy will come easier” 50. 
“Undoubtedly, Denktas was the worst negotiator. Eroglu or Talat, are both 
serving the interests of Turkey on Cyprus” 51. 
                                                             
49 “Είναι ςαν να επιςτρζφουμε ςτο πρότυπο Ντενκτάσ. Τον μιςοφςαμε αλλά είχαμε ζνα κακαρά 
εχκρό. Ενϊ με τον Ταλάτ είναι κάπωσ διφοροφμενο”. 
50 “Αν ο Ζρογλου βγει, κα ζρκει μια ϊρα γρθγορότερα θ διχοτόμθςθ”. 
51 “Αδιαμφιςβιτθτα ο Ντενκτάσ ιταν ο πιο ςκλθρόσ διαπραγματευτισ. Ζρογλου ι Ταλάτ, και οι δφο 
εξυπθρετοφν τα ςυμφζροντα τθσ Τουρκίασ”. 
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The reason that the negotiations started again after the rejection of Annan Plan in 
2004 was the change of the political leadership in both communities. For the first time, 
AKEL in the Republic of Cyprus and CTP in the north, both from the left parties, were in 
charge. Everyone could understand that it was a new phase and that they had to take 
advantage of that opportunity. The positive mood would not last forever. 
On 18 April 2010, Dervis Eroglu from the UBP party won the elections by 50.38% 
against Mehmet Ali Talat by 42.85% (April 2010:1). His election closed a failed period of 
the socialist party to make the difference. It seems that TRNC came back to normal, as it 
was before 2003 with Rauf Denktas. CTP failed due to the high expectations of the 
Republican Party to resolve the problem, lift the embargo and lead to an economical 
improvement. According to Ahmet Sözen it was just the correction of a “political anomaly” 
which was created as a result of major changes. The Right Party took back the reins in the 
north and the Republican Party returned to the well-known role of opposition.
52
  
There are three scenarios to compare with the policy that Eroglu will decide to 
follow
53
: 
1) He will terminate the negotiations and he will begin the process for separation 
of the communities. This evolution will transform the TRNC to a district of 
Turkey and of course Turkey‟s accession process will end. 
2) Turkey will force Eroglu to follow the policy of Ankara and continue the 
negotiations from the point that Talat left off 
3) In Cyprus, except from the two communities, Turkey, Greece, EU the 
Security Council will activate. 
                                                             
52 Antonis, Poludoras, “Από τον Φαηίλ Κουτςιοφκ ςτον Ντερβίσ Ζρογλου”, Kathimerini, 26 April 2010. 
53 Anna, Andreou, “Ο Ζρογλου μπορεί να εκπλιξει πολλοφσ”, Politis, 25 April 2010. 
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In Turkey, the prevailing view about leadership in TRNC is that nobody can resist 
Ankara‟s policy, not even Eroglu. Turkey will force Eroglu to toe Ankara‟s line and work 
effectively within the political, economic and above all military dependence on TRNC by 
motherland Turkey (Iakovou, 2010).  
According to my focus groups, the same opinion predominates within Greek-Cypriot 
youth as they realize that Eroglu is nationalist and he has a hardcore angle about the Cyprus 
problem but in the end Turkey defines the policy that Eroglu must follow. As it seems from 
the statements above, it is obvious that whoever is the president of TRNC -Eroglu or Talat- 
nothing can be changed. The only factor which is open to discussion is the time that 
dichotomy/taksim will be a fact in the island.  
Nevertheless, some of the women of the groups have stated that they do not know 
Eroglu (whereas the focus groups had been done one week before the elections). It is 
remarkable that they did not even want to learn about him. They think that this is has 
nothing to do with their living! Also the members of the group affiliated with the left party 
supported Talat instead of Eroglu as they believed that the collaboration between 
Christofias and Talat could bring about a solution on the island.  
However, the results from the “Cyprus 2015” survey (one year ago) illustrates that 
nor was Mehmet Ali Talat acceptable to the Greek-Cypriots, as 76% answered that they do 
not trust Talat regarding the Cyprus dispute. This answer proves the initial point of view 
that has been described above: the weight of the solution is in the hands of Turkey and not 
in any other politician. The only problem that will be raised is that the change of the 
leadership of TRNC will delay the process of finding a solution in Cyprus.  
According to the last statement about the negotiations, it seems that there is a positive 
atmosphere from both sides‟ leaders. Despite the predictions before the elections about 
Eroglu‟s actions, it seems that already Eroglu has adapted Ankara‟s political line. He 
78 
 
agreed that he will continue the negotiations from the point that Talat left it. At the same 
time he declared that he must fill in the contents of this parameter based on the interests of 
TRNC and Turkey.
54
 Automatically this statement cancels the meaning of the former one. 
The intentions of Eroglu appear different from his statements. Simultaneously he knows 
that any wrong decisions in comparison with the uncompromising attitude which 
characterizes him will cost Turkey membership to the EU. Time will clarify what his real 
purpose is. It is too early to refer to the results of the Eroglu‟s election. 
Eroglu or Talat, the main point is just one: a new failure to find a solution that 
achieves the cohabitation of the two communities under the same roof will reopen with the 
most obvious way the file with alternative‟s option.55  
 
5.2.1 “Time is the worst enemy” 
H-OG “Only the property issue remains unresolved. All the other problems 
have been resolved over time” 56. 
A-OG: “if the negotiations continue for another ten or twenty years, the new 
generation will not care, so dichotomy will be a necessarily solution” 57. 
B-L: “Now my current life is great. I do not want to change anything. If there is 
a possibility to have a solution, I will accept it only if it will not affect my life 
dramatically” 58. 
                                                             
54 Aristos, Aristotelous, “Διαφαινόμενθ ςτρατθγικι Ζρογλου ςτο Κυπριακό”, Haraugi, 7 August 2010. 
55  Antonis, Poludoras, “Το τζλοσ του δρόμου ςτθν αναηιτθςθ ομοςπονδιακισ λφςθσ”, Kathimerini, 5 
May 2010. 
56 “το μόνο πρόβλθμα που υπάρχει είναι το περιουςιακό. Πλα τα υπόλοιπα λφκθκαν με τα χρόνια”. 
57 “ αν ςυνεχιςτοφν οι διαπραγματεφςεισ ακόμθ 10-20 χρόνια, θ νζα γενιά δεν ενδιαφζρεται άρα θ 
διχοτόμθςθ κα είναι μια λφςθ ανάγκθσ”. 
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E-L: “If a dichotomy is what we are in this period in my opinion, I do not have 
any problem” 59. 
There is a common perception that the passage of time created new facts, mostly 
negative, on both sides. After 1974, Cypriots were trying to accept the new situation of the 
island; Turkish Cypriots had to get use to the isolation and the full dependence from 
Turkey and Greek Cypriots to accept that from now on they have to live in a divided 
country and they would rule only half part of it.  
Time probably is the most basic factor which reflects on the Cyprus dispute. As Prof. 
Mpitsakis referred when there was a chance to resolve the problem between governments 
(including the Greek one) let the time pass over and as a result the de facto dichotomy of 
the island came about.
60
 Nowadays, the Republic of Cyprus is only responsible for the 
future of the country. However the Cyprus problem will be resolved when Cyprus and 
Turkey utilize the benefit of time. It has to be noted that Turkey took advantage of all the 
chances it had, unlike the Republic of Cyprus
61
 which just preferred to convince the 
international community that they were the victims of the story. As ex-president Vasileiou 
illustrated “our experience shows while we had the right on our side, it seems that the 
passage of time was working against us and not in our favor.
62
 
Almost all the members of my focus groups agreed that a lot of time has been 
wasted. New generations realize this deadlock which brought about a dichotomy/taksim 
                                                                                                                                                                              
58 “αυτι τθ ςτιγμι είμαι μια χαρά και δεν κζλω να αλλάηει θ ηωι μου. Αν είναι να βρεκεί μια λφςθ 
αλλά δεν κα με επθρεάηει δραματικά, ασ βρεκεί”. 
59 “Αν θ διχοτόμθςθ είναι το τί ηοφμε αυτι τθ ςτιγμι, κατά εμζνα δεν ζχω κανζνα πρόβλθμα”. 
60 Eutixis, Mpitsakis, “Εκνικιςμόσ και ενδοτιςμόσ: μια πάγια αντίφαςθ”, Eleutherotupia, 28 December 
2007. 
61 Ouranios, Ioannides, “Η ειδοποιόσ διαφορά”, Simerini, 24 January 2010. 
62 Giorgos, Vasileiou, “Απάντθςθ ςτο διάγγελμα του Τ. Ραπαδόπουλου”, Hmerisia, 18 April 2004. 
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and the problem is not only the fact that a lot of time has been spent, but it is wasted 
without any result. The problem is that under these circumstances TRNC will be 
recognized as a legal regime and then, the plan of Turkey even before the foundation of the 
Republic of Cyprus would be completed: taksim! 
In this sense, time is absolutely connected with the partition of Cyprus. It seems that 
this situation is really convenient for some people. Otherwise it cannot be explained how 
thirty six years have passed without any progress. Status quo was a temporary solution 
which came to be practical and permanent for everyone: Greek Cypriots control the Greek 
part even if it is the half of the island, with the impression that they are fighting for the 
other half part and Turkey and Turkish Cypriots finally create a homogenous population 
and they obtain the control of the 1/3 of the island.
63
 Although the best scenario had been 
described by Dionusiou objectively; first of all Greek-Cypriots have to stay united. They 
want a solution! They want a good solution and if someone has to reject it, let Turkey do 
that.
64
 
Furthermore, some members of the focus groups admitted that only the property 
problem remains unresolved. All other problems have been resolved over time. According 
to the A-OG‟s statement above, if there will not be any progress for the next ten or twenty 
years, dichotomy/taksim would be the only solution that can be provided. All the answers 
in the focus groups show that dichotomy/taksim is more popular instead of the bi-zonal, bi-
communal federation. All the surveys, including my focus groups illustrate that the present 
situation is the most acceptable. Especially, Greek Cypriots cannot realize yet that the 
status quo is against their interest and that they have to work towards a better future. It has 
to be mentioned that in a survey in 2004 by Alexandros Lordos, a large majority of the 
                                                             
63 Makarios, Drousiotis, “Το ςτάτουσ κβο ςε κρίςιμθ κατάςταςθ”, Politis, 29 November 2009. 
64 Dionusis, Dionusiou, “Το Κυπριακό μασ βολεφει”, Politis, 6 June 2010. 
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Greek-Cypriots (69% approximately) were clearly opposed to the prospect of a two-state 
solution. Nevertheless, while the older Greek Cypriots are clearly opposed to a Two-State 
solution, among the youth there is a strong tendency towards the acceptance of an agreed 
partition. Only 6 years after that survey, the survey by “Cyprus 2015” organization shows 
that the new generation has a tendency to say “No” to a future plan but on the other hand 
they reject the possibility of a permanent status quo or dichotomy.  
Based on my research, my informants affiliated with the left party cannot accept 
dichotomy/taksim as a solution. At the same time, all the other members (older, from the 
right parties, with or without refugees‟ parents) seem to prefer the situation as it is right 
now and they do not mind that it will become a dichotomy. The fear of change is diffused 
within their hearts. A research after 2004 made by the journalist L. Charalampous turn out 
that the majority of Greek-Cypriots prefer a dichotomy because is the most suitable 
solution for them. They do not want any other solution because they are afraid that a 
change will reflect unfavorably on their personal interests.
65
  B-L‟s statement illustrates 
exactly what is described above: the solution that she only accepts, it will be the one which 
can promise no changes to her current life. 
Simultaneously, time has another outcome: the first generation of refugees who lived 
at the occupied Cyprus has stronger feelings to return to their villages. As it concerns the 
second and the third generation probably the desire of going back will be blunt as the 
experienced memories will actually be covered by the narrative knowledge and the transfer 
experienced (Lillikas, 2008: 94). The new generation has no connections with the occupied 
land in the north. It is like a different country to them. The only things that connect them to 
the place are the memories from their parents or grand-parents, nothing more.  
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To conclude, Cypriots must accept that the status quo is not a solution. The 
continuity of the dispute means automatically the loss of the other half of the island 
permanently. Ideas such as E-L‟s statement above have to be erased. What Cypriots have 
now, cannot be compared with dichotomy/taksim. The results of dichotomy will be obvious 
in both sides. A conciliatory federal solution will be the only possibility to stop dichotomy 
which unavoidably, after some years, will change the date of the population also converting 
Cypriots to a minority.
66
 
People start to act prudently when they run out of any other possibility. In Cyprus, 
some of the politicians and journalists seem to still believe there is time to act like this. 
They did not realize that there are no other opportunities. Time is very valuable and the 
international community has become exhausted from this dispute. Even the politicians of 
this country are tired. Comments from the focus groups such as: “I do not care”67, “they 
will make us out to be desperate and in the end we will prefer a dichotomy”68, “I got bored 
from the Cyprus problem
69” describe clearly the intention of Greek Cypriot youngsters in 
my focus groups. So, Cypriots in general have to think seriously what is the best solution 
for them. This problem has to end and it has to end with the desirable effect.  
 
 
 
                                                             
66 Menelaos, Avraam, “Ζνωςθ, Ανεξαρτθςία, Διχοτόμθςθ”, Kathimerini, 6 December 2009. 
67 “Δεν με ενδιαφζρει”. 
68 “Θα μασ κάνουν να αγανακτιςουμε και να κζλουμε ςτο τζλοσ διχοτόμθςθ”. 
69 “Βαρζκθκα το Κυπριακό”. 
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5.2.2 A great opportunity had been missed or a better solution will 
come?  
E-F: “We have just been released from an opportunity of a dysfunctional 
state” 70. 
B-R: “An opportunity had been missed and it will be released some 
years later, as it happened also with the Gali ideas
71
. 
E-OG: “The Annan Plan was about compromises that we are not ready 
to accept” 72. 
As the years are passing by, the question remains the same: was the last plan the 
greatest opportunity for the island? There was a rumor that the Annan Plan would be the 
last effort for a solution where the UN will be involved. As it seems, six years later, that 
was just a rumor. They are still in Cyprus and they are trying to help the two communities 
find an agreement. 
Looking at the results from my focus groups most of my informants (except some 
from the group of the right party and the group of older people which appeared to be more 
nationalists) agreed that an opportunity had been missed in 2004. The argument was if the 
Annan Plan was our greatest opportunity for a solution or as E-F characterized it, it was an 
opportunity of a dysfunctional state. 
Furthermore, according to B-R‟s statement above, the given opportunity will be 
released again later, probably with a different name, but still based on the Annan Plan, as it 
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72 “Το ςχζδιο Ανάν ιταν κζμα υποχωριςεων που εμείσ δεν ιμαςταν ζτοιμοι να δεχτοφμε”. 
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happened with the Gali ideas. The 5
th
 Annan Plan has a lot of disadvantages but admittedly 
it was a plan that can accomplish some of the needs of Cypriots.  
Nowadays, the expression “every new plan is worse than the last one73” has become 
like a political movement. Presently, no one believes that the leader of the Republic of 
Cyprus can find a solution that will satisfy most of the citizens of this country. As one of 
my participants (E-OG) quoted the Annan Plan was about compromises that Cypriots are 
not ready to accept. However, there are some optimistic who believe that a better plan will 
come soon. But is it that ideal which led us 36 years without a solution? Sometimes it may 
sounds utopian for a result Greek-Cypriots must reject any kind of a plan which does not 
fall within their guidelines. It is all about compromises. How many compromises you are 
ready to accept? 
If the leaders could determine their opinion, it might be easier for the people to 
decide what they really want because if they do not know what they want, it will be 
difficult to understand what plan is an opportunity or a tragedy. Nothing can be decided the 
way it was. History will show if the Annan Plan was a plan that can leave Cypriots happy 
and satisfied that they received what they so desired.  
The only good thing from the missed opportunity was that for the first time Cypriots 
started behaving as one. A chance has been lost but Cypriots are still there waiting at the 
table. If there is a will, they can persuade a better future for this little island. A simple 
solution may be found only when the people support all of these efforts. 
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5.3.1 Unequal development of the communities 
Z-R: “If I was for twenty-five years in an embargo, I would want also a 
solution to be found, to feel free again” 74. 
A-R: “They are gypsies because their houses are fit to drop but at the 
same time every house has a satellite” 75. 
E-F: “It gave me the impression that they are really underdeveloped” 76. 
Differences between the two communities were created even before the Republic of 
Cyprus. Under the Ottoman Empire, the Muslim elite of the island worked in agriculture 
unlike the “Christians” who were using commerce (Kizilyurek, 1999: 83). As a result, 
Greek-Cypriots in 1960‟s they were wealthy unlike Turkish-Cypriots who could not play 
an important role within the economy of Cyprus.  
However, in order to be objective, it has to be clarified that the big distinction 
between the communities came after 1974. Two different people, two different parts are 
living in the same island but as it turns out that they grew up under completely dissimilar 
conditions and incidents. Greek Cypriots have to accept the consequences of the war and 
Turkish Cypriots the embargo. 
In my research, a lot of times, some of the participants criticized the Turkish-
Cypriot‟s way of living. Adjectives like “gypsy” and “mucky” could not be avoided in the 
discussion. They cannot or they do not want to understand that the last 25 years, Turkish-
Cypriots are under the embargo. They cannot import or export anything. The Z-R‟s 
statement illustrates clearly the reason that Turkish-Cypriots wanted the Annan Plan to be 
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accepted. The twenty five years under the embargo are enough to make Turkish-Cypriots to 
prefer any solution of the Cyprus problem. They want to feel free again. Nevertheless, 
some of my participants wanted to highlight the Turkish-Cypriot “dirtiness”. According to 
A-R‟s statement above, they are gypsies because their houses are fit to drop but at the same 
time every house has a satellite. Almost the same comment has been stated by E-F. He was 
shocked because the animals were in the house. Even his grandfather 30-40 years ago did 
not have the animals in the house. This picture made him to believe that they are really 
underdeveloped. 
As Mintsis described the two communities are like day and night. The Republic of 
Cyprus controls only the south part of the island. It is distinguished by national 
homogeneity, a democratic political system, respect for human rights and a developed 
economy. On the other hand, in the North there is not a national and cultural homogeneity, 
not even a democratic political system. Actually there is an active role of Turkey in their 
politics. In addition, it appears that there is violation of human rights and an 
underdeveloped economy of which 100% mirrors that of Turkey. It has to be mentioned 
again that after the military intervention/ invasion the international community decided 
TRNC to be in an embargo but it was not the only reason which made the situation much 
harder for Turkish-Cypriots‟ economy (2006: 46-47).  
Undoubtedly, today the differences are even bigger than before. Greek-Cypriots 
managed to handle the bad effects of the war and they got back on their feet. At the same 
time Turkish-Cypriots have been appeased, as the motherland Turkey takes care of them. In 
fact, the opening of the crossing points in 2003 was a source of a salvation to the north. 
People started to have contact with “the other” and start hoping for a better future. This has 
been proven also to the Annan Plan, as they had voted for more than 65% of the TRNC‟s 
popular “Yes vote”. Now, there is a booming economy, and the situation has been 
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improved. Tassos Papadopoulos repeatedly was saying that they need about ten years to 
reach the economy of the Republic of Cyprus.
77
 The ugly truth is that they have already 
accomplished the proportional economy, and they have done the substructure in order to 
achieve further development in the future i.e. casinos, five star hotels, since basically the 
economy of Cyprus is based on the tourism.  
As concerns the population, there was a big change in the north. After 1974, Turkey 
followed a program of settlement in the occupied land and as a result Turkish Cypriots 
have become a minority in their own part. According to the government census, Turkish 
Cypriots before 1974 were 120.000, namely 18% of the population. Logically today the 
population should have been 180-200.000, instead of that the population in the north is 
estimated to be 300.000 (Lillikas: 2008: 56). According to Serdar Denktas, the settlers are 
double arithmetically from Turkish-Cypriots (9 July 2010). They have been a minority and 
the worst part is that now the settlers can vote, so they are the ones who can do whatever 
their want. Turkish-Cypriot‟s opinion cannot be heard. Now the benefits of the settlers rule 
in TRNC‟s political system. 
These are the life-time experiences that the youth were receiving the last few years. 
Greek-Cypriots do not care about politics as they have an assured future and Turkish 
Cypriots want to collaborate with Greek-Cypriots in order to get their lives back. Certainly, 
there is a necessity for a change in both communities‟ mentality if they really want to find a 
solution. From time to time the economy of Cyprus can change as it is not as stable as the 
other countries. This case has to puzzle each Cypriot who feels comfortable with the 
present situation.  
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5.3.2 Wealth of Greek-Cypriots 
Γ-F: “They gave us money and the wealth caused us considerable 
impairment to our social and political matters” 78. 
The Republic of Cyprus has made a miraculous and remarkably fast recovery from 
the turmoil that rocked the country during the 1970s (Etincoff, 2006: 31). The economic 
miracle of the Republic of Cyprus can be explained under theories of social psychology. It 
is rational that people, who are in danger of their survival from another more powerful 
country, build a kind of “psychology defence” which has a resultant express economical 
improvement in order to balance the asymmetric threat from the powerful enemy (Mintsis, 
2006: 20).  
The truth is that Greek-Cypriots worked hard to change the situation. It would be 
impossible though, without taking financial assistance from external factors. After the 
endless annotations about “the ambient atmosphere”, it arose that Cyprus was taking 
money from USA in order to cover the expenses for refugees, hospitals and development 
projects.
79
 Even under these circumstances, it cannot be denied that Greek Cypriots worked 
hard to change their futures. 
However, reaching 2010, it seems that the new generation has its future under control 
and ceased to deal with the Cyprus dispute. As Γ-F statement above, the wealth of the 
Greek-Cypriot part caused impairment to the society. The percentages of the youth‟s 
abstinence in politics are really high and it is about time to reconsider. They inherited a 
world without ethics and in the end the only thing that it is really matters is money. It 
seems they became educated people without an opinion, without beliefs, without any 
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standards. The only thing which they believe, if they believe in anything, is money. People 
admire the rich and the powerful and at the same time mock the poor and the weak.
80
 
Cyprus dispute is not a problem for the youth. As it seems from the focus groups, 
they are not interested about the problem of their country. They have better things to do 
rather the solution that it must be found. They have been raised so well and in the end they 
forgot that half a part of their country is occupied. Any kind of a solution does not make 
any difference to them. In the short-term, they do not have anything to earn from a new 
situation. This status is confirmed also from CYMAR, KADEM‟s survey which shows that 
Greek-Cypriots youth are less enthusiastic about a settlement than their parents, insofar as 
the future is “already open to them” while they do not experience their parents‟ nostalgia 
about lost villages and properties (2006). A solution will change the system and probably 
they will get into useless trouble. That is another reason why the new generation prefers a 
dichotomy. Leaving things as they are right now will not affect their lives.  
The ancestors of Greek-Cypriots wanted to forget the bad outcome of the war. They 
set up the society in a way that they can erase the memories of 1974 and move forward. 
However, there was an unexpected result. Wealth and happiness filled the hearts of young 
people and now there is no place for any worries. There is no need for something new 
which can change and actually disturb their lives. Melina Merkouri
81
, a great Greek 
politician declared that culture is as important as the military defence.
82
 In Cyprus, who can 
anyone understand that statement when the only thing that matters is how to gain more 
money?  
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The direct connection between money and solution can be described when someone 
asks if Greek-Cypriots want a solution. Some romantic minority will answer with their 
hand on the heart that they want a solution as soon as possible. All the others, with their 
hands in their pockets will do the financial balance sheet before they will make their 
decisions (Dionusiou, 6 June 2010: 4). A possible solution will be achieved when people 
stop referring to that as an economical problem to which Cypriots have to find the 
appropriate solution. And if the older people cannot change, it is time for the new 
generation to seize the opportunity (Carpe Diem) and to create new conditions of their 
lives. 
 
5.3.3 Unfortunate by their own responsibilities 
Γ-R “All these years they are focusing on who was responsible instead of 
who would find a solution” 83. 
Under the framework of finding a fair solution, it would be more correct for each 
party to think over its responsibility about the Cyprus dispute. Greek-Cypriots grew up with 
the feeling of injustice and all these years they were trying to convince the international 
community that the responsibility for the tragedy of 1974 lay with Turkey and its aims. 
They wanted to appear to the international community as angels who they did not do 
anything wrong and they are completely innocent as with concerns to the Turkish military 
intervention/invasion.  
Nobody has been taught that in a situation like this, both parts are responsible, 
directly or indirectly. Hiding behind the results of the occupation does not automatically 
means that the junta or the coup d‟état are not responsible as well. It was a period (with 
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unpleasant consequences) where everyone was trying to ensure its benefits with Cyprus. 
Now is not the right time to be silent. It is time to take responsibility. It is time to tell the 
truth without evasion.
84
 Someone has to clarify to the public the facts which led to a 
divided Cyprus. That probably will cost him or his party but at least he will gain respect 
from the citizens of Cyprus. It is not a coincidence that in 60 years of the foundation of the 
Republic of Cyprus, there is not one politician who admitted fault and accepted the 
responsibility for his actions. Instead of this, the same politicians are ruling the island 
without remorse. 
A leftist participant in the focus groups (Γ-F) reminded the group the necessity of 
misidentification with Nikos Kazantzakis
85‟ words: 
“You have to love the responsibility. You have to say that your duty is to save 
the world by yourself. If it will not rescue, I will be the only one who is 
responsible.”86 
Nevertheless, at schools Greek-Cypriots have been taught with texts which actually 
rehearse facts from the Asia Minor Catastrophe‟s period and the enmity between the two 
countries, texts that described Turks as an unquestioning nation who are only responsible 
for the Cyprus issue. 
Although, the results from the Cyprus 2015‟ survey are encouraging it appears that 
Greek-Cypriots are accepting that both communities have made mistakes in the past. 49% 
declared that this statement is absolutely correct and another 38% answered that they 
somehow agree. The 4% who disagree completely probably consist of the nationalists who 
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September 2009. 
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do not accept and blame regarding the situation. It is about time Cypriots took off the 
blinkers in order to compromise the mistakes that each community has made. 
As the young boy reminded to the group Kazantzakis‟ words, Γ-R realized that for all 
these years they are focusing on who was responsible instead of who would find a solution. 
Blaming “the other” has to be stopped and use this energy to achieve a better possible 
solution for the island. 
 
5.4  The accession of Cyprus to the European Union 
B-F “It is better to belong to a big union instead of fighting alone for its 
rights”87 
H-NR “They made him believe that he was safe whereas in his opinion it is a 
feigned security that is theirs”88. 
The European Union represents the most powerful endeavor of the European nations 
for development, reconciliation and progress. The European Union is a continent with 
many different traditions and languages but with shared values such as democracy, freedom 
and social justice; cherished values well known to North Americans. Indeed, the European 
Union motto is “United in Diversity” (Etingoff, 2006:9).  
Cyprus officially applied for membership to the EU in 1990. However, EU was not 
sure if the accession of Cyprus was a good choice, mostly because of the Cyprus question. 
Europeans had strong reservations among member states over admitting Cyprus because 
they did not want any state to join the EU with serious unresolved political problems.
89
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According to Loizides, EU engagement in Cyprus has been based on the expectations that 
Turkey and Turkish-Cypriots on the one hand, and Greece and Greek-Cypriots on the 
other, would cooperate in reaching a settlement, without one side being held hostage by the 
intransigence of the other. Although, it was extremely important, a settlement was not a 
precondition for admitting Cyprus into the EU (2002: 429-442). Yet, it is not a coincidence, 
that the time that the Annan Plan was thought to be accepted, the Secretary-General 
proclaimed that intention and all the other who did not want Cyprus to join the EU. The 
aim of this “timing” was obviously a way of pressure towards the Greek-Cypriot part in 
order to accept the plan (Aimiliades et al, 2003:149).  
Finally on 1
st
 of May 2004 Cyprus joined EU without any problem. The dominant 
rumor, that Cyprus would not join the EU if it would not find a solution seemed to be 
incorrect. The fake dilemma of “solution and accession or no solution-no accession” 
proved that it was also a check-mate in the game of politics. Despite all of these intrigues, 
Greek-Cypriots rejected the plan but eventually the rejection did not reflect the accession to 
the EU.  
The fact that Cyprus became a full member of the EU is characterized as the biggest 
political achievement of the governments of Nicosia and Athens since the catastrophe in 
1974. However the atmosphere is not so optimistic for Turkey‟s ambitious desire to join the 
EU. It appears that Turkey and its allies are more important to Europe instead of the 
problematic Cyprus issue. The EU had been founded in order to create a positive spirit 
among the countries after the wars. Even if they were trying too hard, it was too difficult 
for each country to forget its interests and act as a real union. The predisposition of the EU 
to continue punishing Cyprus about the rejection of the Annan plan in 2004 is reflected in 
many ways. It is ready to find a way to resolve the dispute without concern for the cost.  
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The point of the EU is that every little state has equal rights with the bigger ones. 
Although, Cyprus realizes that even if it is an equal member, it cannot act by itself alone. 
For instance, as President Christofias noticed if Cyprus, or even Greece, used a veto against 
Turkey‟s accession then the only thing that they would accomplish is the opposition of the 
other 25 members (Sofokleous, 2009). The only way out of this deadlock is for Cyprus to 
start making allies within the EU. The developing partnerships within the European Union 
will give her the chance to balance the British interests with her own. 
Before the accession of Cyprus to the EU, a lot of scenarios had been reported about 
the benefits that Cyprus would obtain. Six years after the accession, it is not clear to the 
people the benefits that they would gain after becoming members of the EU. Nevertheless, 
it is of concern that Cyprus, as a full member of the EU, will be helped in order to find a 
solution for the Cyprus dispute. The most important though is the safety that the EU can 
offer, now that Cyprus is signed as European territory. Any foreign intervention in the 
territory of Cyprus will be considered interference on European soil. The power that 
Cyprus earned from joining the EU and also the start of Turkey‟s negotiations to join the 
EU brought forward a path to assist the efforts to resolve the Cyprus question. 
According to my research, when the participants of the focus groups were asked in 
what extent they feel secure as European citizens, almost all the participants in the focus 
groups have given the same answer; they feel more secure because if Turkey wants to 
interfere again, it has to think it twice.
90
 It is also obvious that the females in the groups are 
expressing their feelings in favour of EU intensely unlike the most of the men who agreed 
with B-F‟s statement above. He believes that it is better to be a member of a big union 
instead of being alone and trying to survive by yourself. The answer of H-NR which is 
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illustrated above was also astonishing. He noticed that joining the EU, it would be safer but 
in the end, there is only a feigned security. 
 Furthermore, the leftist‟s men of the groups seemed that they did not ever feel that 
they were in danger, so they cannot think of the EU‟s benefits. It has to be mentioned that 
the left party AKEL was against the accession of Cyprus to the EU. 
According to the survey by UNFICYP, Cypriots were asked the same question. 49% 
of Greek-Cypriots answered “somewhat secure” and another 29% feel very secure. In 
addition, the latest survey “Youth in Cyprus” illustrated 63% of Greek-Cypriots either 
agree or strongly agree that the overall Cyprus‟ accession to the EU is a positive step for its 
people. At the same time Greek-Cypriots seemed to be skeptical as to whether or not the 
EU represented the guarantee of lasting peace. 
“It is better to be like Ireland instead of Iceland”91 (Papademetriou, 2009). This is the 
prevailing motto in Brussels about Cyprus. The bankruptcy in Iceland showed the power of 
belonging to an organization like EU and EMU. It appears that the economical crisis all 
over the world would have radical effects in Cyprus if it did not enter the EMU as well.  
As already noted, EU has the power and the means to support Cypriots to find a 
solution. Nothing can be done though, if the direct interested parts will not help the 
situation, especially the Republic of Cyprus which is a full and equal member of the EU. 
The accession of the Republic of Cyprus to the EU in 2004 in conjunction with Turkey‟s 
own European ambitions created new dimensions to the Cyprus questions (Theophanous, 
2009) and the leadership has to take advantage of this new opportunity. Greek-Cypriots and 
Turkish-Cypriots must evaluate the accession of Cyprus correctly and take the last chance. 
They have to “find” a common European future in order to resolve the problem. It is 
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obvious that only under the EU‟s umbrella can a solution be found. The two communities 
must collaborate in order to coexist peacefully in a United European state.  
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Chapter 6 
Conclusion 
The aim of this thesis is to understand the youth‟s dispositions or preparedness 
for a settlement of the Cyprus problem. In order to explain their intentions, I tried to 
analyze their way of thinking, through a great deal of factors, according to their 
answers in my focus groups. The idea for this topic arose when I was accepted for the 
MA in International Relations at Istanbul Bilgi University. Many times I found myself 
having to explain to my friends the reasons why I have chosen to study here in 
Istanbul. At that time I realized that the Greek-Cypriot youth is not as open-minded as 
I had previously thought it to be. It was a dangerous challenge for me to achieve 
writing this thesis with that title because is actually included me as an informant. 
 Using the focus groups as a research method, I achieve results from their 
beliefs regarding the Cyprus dispute. Though understanding their feelings and at times 
their somewhat pessimistic viewpoints towards reconciliation, I gained worthy 
research material for my thesis. 
 The new generation grew up in a divided island. The de facto division helped 
for the creation of nationalism. It is not a mere coincidence that most people in the 
focus groups declared that they were expecting the Turkish-Cypriots to look like 
aliens. 
 It is significant that the form of nationalism in the new generation of Greek-
Cypriots follows the differences of the two biggest political parties AKEL and DISI: 
youth who are affiliated with the right party support the Greek ideals unlike the youth 
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who are affiliated with the left party who support the Republic of Cyprus – discarding 
anything that is Greek.  
 Nevertheless, it is still a puzzle to the Greek-Cypriot community that there are 
some people who believe and want Turkish-Cypriots on the island. Greek-Cypriots 
have never accepted the existence of Turkish-Cypriots to live on the island. In 1963 
the conflict started from the fact that the Greek-Cypriots believed that Turkish-
Cypriots were a minority and that they did not deserve to have equal rights with them. 
In 2010, it seems that there are some single cases which still refuse the Turkish-
Cypriots as citizens of the Republic of Cyprus. Although it is not possible to make a 
generalization still what appears from my focus groups gives us clues for further 
research. 
 First of all, Cypriots have to accept the whole situation with the advantages 
and disadvantages if they want to create the feeling of tolerance. My findings showed 
that young from the left parties have been prepared more than the others concerning 
the co-existence with Turkish-Cypriots. Besides, AKEL was the first party which 
used the motto: “Turkish-Cypriots are our brothers92”. 
 Unfortunately, Greek-Cypriot‟s ancestors took care of ingraining their hearts 
with enmity against the Turkish-Cypriots. Sometimes people cannot understand the 
difference between Turk and Turkish-Cypriot, not even the youth. I think that the new 
generation is pretending that it cannot see the truth but at the same time it argues 
about the prefix “pseudo” that Greek-Cypriots use when they want to refer to 
something in the North. Yet, it is not clear because during the focus groups there were 
                                                             
92 “Οι Τουρκοκφπριοι είναι αδζρφια μασ.” 
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people who asked me to stop using “pseudo” and at the same time some others who 
expected me to correct the word by using it. 
 How can you be open-minded when the only thing that you are learning at 
school is how barbaric the Turks were to your predecessors? Almost all the groups 
illustrated that all of them, directly or indirectly, have been affected from the stories 
that they had been taught at school. There is a necessity for all the books to be 
changed as soon as possible. It has to be re-written again, without changing history. 
The facts can be described objectively and the books can be referred to Greek-
Cypriot‟s mistakes as well. Greek-Cypriots cannot be the victims all the time however 
there are errors on both sides. 
Most of the problems between the two communities can be resolved 
practically. For instance, if you have a Turkish-Cypriot as a neighbour, you will have 
a relationship with him, whether it be a typical or an atypical relationship. Only one 
person announced that she did not want to have a Turkish-Cypriot neighbour because 
she purposefully wanted to avoid any kind of a relationship with a Turkish-Cypriot. 
This statement should be changed. I also agreed with the people who believed that the 
idea of “the others” can be demolished after a meeting and a dialogue with the 
opposite side. There are nationalists within both communities. The point is to put 
these voices in a margin and not the opposite. 
Beyond the rejection of the Annan Plan, a lot of characteristics of Greek-
Cypriots can be found. A Plan with almost ten thousand pages has to be problematic. 
Moreover, the new generation seems to be confused about the Annan Plan. A big 
percentage of participants from the focus groups did not know the meaning of a Bi-
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zonal, Bi-communal Federation. The fact that there was not sufficient information is 
true but the superfluous number of pages of the plan cannot be ignored. 
It is of importance to note the comment made by the A-NR about the 
predictable results of the Annan Plan. He illustrated that the proportion of the people 
who reject the plan was the same proportion of the political parties which supported to 
vote “No”. I have to confess that I had not thought about the results from that point of 
view until after hearing his comment. I knew that Greek-Cypriots at every age follow 
their political parties. However I assumed that in a crucial decision such as this that 
every person would decide according to his/her criteria. As it seems no one voted 
rationally. They just followed their political parties‟ decision. Even if some of them 
had doubts unfortunately Tassos Papadopoulos‟ speech convinced everybody that 
they had to reject the plan. 
The role of Mass Media in Cyprus was and still is powerful. The problem is 
that nowadays the media does not so much inform its audiences about the news, but 
they produce news. The difference between those is that in the first case they just 
describe the event as it is but in the second, they modulate the news according to their 
own interests. 
As Z-NR stated, the Annan Plan was an opportunity which was missed but it 
was unfavorable opportunity so it does not matter that it had been missed. I want a 
better solution and I believe that something better will come
93
. It is realized that now 
it is more difficult with Christofias and Eroglu in charge but probably the UN will 
push both sides to agree on a solution. However, there will not be a great number of 
                                                             
93 “Μια ευκαιρία χάκθκε αλλά τθν βλζπω ςαν δυςμενι ευκαιρία άρα δεν πειράηει που χάκθκε. Θζλω 
κάτι καλφτερο και πιςτεφω ότι κα ζρκει κάτι καλφτερο”. 
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changes. It cannot be expected to be in full favour of the Greek-Cypriot community. 
As A-OG clarifies it is to what extent you are ready to compromise. Unfortunately, 
Greek-Cypriots believe that compromise looks and feels like surrender. 
As it was analyzing the data from my focus groups, I focused on different 
factors which my informants verified the Greek-Cypriot‟s behavior. First of all, once 
again was that Cypriots cannot decide about their future without following their 
political house‟s belief. The new generation can understand that they have to 
eliminate this dependency with the political party but on the other hand it seems that 
they are also just following their political leaders‟ opinion. 
Another problem is that the politicians will never risk their careers over the 
Cyprus question. They know that it needs only one wrong action to change them to 
bad politicians. The Cyprus dispute is like a double-edged sword: it can easily take 
the politicians to the top but it is even more easily able to destroy them. 
The worst enemy of the problem however is the fight against time. Time has 
brought with it a great deal of problems as it makes for a permanent de facto division 
between the two communities. The new generation has been raised in that situation. If 
it is to continue like then, then the youth will be interested to change the facts so that a 
dichotomy will be the only solution. Young people have accepted the Cyprus problem 
for what it is and they do not care to do anything to change it. Unfortunately the well 
being of the Greek-Cypriot community did not help the Greek-Cypriot youth to 
understand that they have more things to gain if the island is not divided into two. 
No one has learnt how to take responsibility. Both sides have made a lot of 
mistakes. If the Greek-Cypriot youth cannot compromise with their own mistakes 
102 
 
then it is useless to try to reconcile with Turkish-Cypriots. It is time to stop blaming 
“the others” for the present situation. Greek-Cypriots are as much responsible as “the 
others” regarding the Cyprus dispute. 
The accession of Cyprus to the EU, while it was expected that it will change 
the situation, my data showed that they do not believe that the EU will help Cyprus to 
find a solution. Nothing has been changed from 2004. Nevertheless, most people in 
the groups and especially the females highlighted that the EU is not the NATO but it 
is still an organization which can offer help should it be needed. 
During the focus groups we did not skip a discussion about the difference 
between Talat and Eroglu. Some of them did not know who Eroglu was (the focus 
groups took place one week before the elections). The participants, who knew about 
Eroglu, illustrated that Eroglu is more nationalist so it would be more difficult to 
agree with Christofias for a solution. But Ankara is the main factor. If Turkey joins 
the EU, it would not try anything that would cause the rejection of a future plan.  
The results of my own research showed that there are not big differences 
between the participants in the focus groups except from those who are affiliated by 
their political view.  Greek-Cypriot youths have to understand that the Cyprus 
problem cannot be resolved by only one person or one political party. Every angle of 
the dispute is a national issue. There is a necessity for a collective claim with the 
intention of a desirable solution in the end. 
The last of my focus groups did not have any specific characteristic excepting 
that the participants were older than the others. Their points of view were black and 
white but also far more nationalistic. I cannot give an explanation for this but I can 
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only assume that as someone uses informants older than the previous generations, the 
fanaticism and the nationalism will be expressed strongly and with far more 
vehemence. 
In addition, when I decided how the groups were to be divided, I did not think 
that the dimension of gender would be important. One of the findings that I did not 
focus in depth but it is important for future research is gender, as in my focus groups 
the females have chosen not to care about the political functions. They did not wish to 
have a voice in the political sphere or to share the views of hundreds of others for the 
betterment of the community. They only wanted to express their thoughts and feelings 
when it came to everyday issues in general. 
According to my focus groups, Greek-Cypriot youth feel powerless to make 
any changes toward the Cyprus question. They seem to forget that small actions can 
bring about major changes to the world. They just have to take advantage of the 
opportunities and to become a driving force in building bridges between the two 
communities which, although live separately still have a lot of common bonds. As the 
Greek-Cypriot new generation begins to communicate with each other, the acceptance 
of the co-existence will be a natural and healthy progression into the future.  
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Appendix 
Appendix 1: Participants Profile by Group 
Participant Information 
Groups Age (years old) Sex 
(Female/Male) 
Occupation 
1 - F    
A 23 M Student 
Β 24 M Unemployed 
Γ 24 M Student 
Γ 23 F Student 
Δ 26 M Lawyer 
Ε 24 M Student 
Ζ 25 M Student 
2 - R     
Α 23 F Student 
Β 23 M Student 
Γ 25 M Hostess 
Γ 24 F Speech Therapist 
Δ 25 F Student 
Ε 26 F Student 
Ζ 24 F Stewardess 
Θ 24 F Student 
3 - L     
Α 25 M Student 
Β 24 F Student 
Γ 24 M Unemployed 
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Γ 25 M Trainer 
Δ 27 F Accountant 
Ε 26 M Teacher 
Ζ 24 M Student 
4 - NR     
Α 21 M Student 
Β 22 M Student 
Γ 23 F Land Estimator  
Γ 25 M Student 
Δ 24 M Shop Assistant 
Ε 24 M Estate agent 
Ζ 24 M Private Employee 
Θ 23 F Student 
5 - OG    
Α 29 F Teacher 
Β 27 M Musician 
Γ 28 M Private Employee 
Γ 28 M Accountant 
Δ 29 F Lawyer 
Ε 28 F Chemical Engineer 
Ζ 28 M Civil Engineer 
Total : 37 
 
Group 1 – F = Participants with refugee parents 
Group 2 – R = Participants affiliated to the Right parties (i.e. DISI and DIKO) 
Group 3 – L = Participants affiliated to the Left parties (i.e. AKEL and EDEK) 
Group 4 – NR = Participants with not refugee‟s parents 
Group 5 – OG = Participants older than the others (average 28) without any specific characteristics 
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Appendix 2: Focus group‟s questions (in Greek) 
1.  Καζεκεξηλά αθνύκε ζηηο εηδήζεηο όηη ε ιύζε ηνπ Κππξηαθνύ ζα είλαη βαζηζκέλε 
ζηε δηδσληθή, δηθνηλνηηθή νκνζπνλδία. ΢ε πνηό βαζκό γλσξίδεηε ηηο έλλνηεο 
απηέο? Έρεηε ππόςε ηη ζεκαίλεη ε θάζε κία μερσξηζηά? 
2. Αλ είρεο λα δηαιέμεηο κεηαμύ δηδσληθήο, δηθνηλνηηθήο νκνζπνλδίαο ή δηρνηόκεζε, 
ηί ζα πξνηηκνύζεο? 
3. Μεηά ηελ έληαμε ηεο Κύπξνπ ζηελ Δ.Δ, λνηώζεηο όηη έρεη αιιάμεη θάηη? Γηα 
παξάδεηγκα αηζζάλεζαη πην αζθαιήο? όηη θάπνηνο ζα ζε πξνζηαηεύζεη ελάληηα 
ζηνπο Σ/Κ θαη θαη‟ επέθηαζε ηελ Σνπξθία? 
4. ΢‟ αξέζεη ε πνιηηηθή θαηάζηαζε ηεο Κύπξνπ έηζη όπσο είλαη ζήκεξα?(΢ηάζηκε, 
κνηξαζκέλε ζηα 2) 
5. ΢αο ελδηαθέξεη λα βξεζεί ιύζε ζην Κππξηαθό? 
6. Πηζηεύεηο όηη κπνξνύκε λα δήζνπκε αξκνληθά κεηά από έλα ζρέδην ιύζεο? (Κάησ 
από πνηέο ζπλζήθεο?) 
7. Πηζηεύεηο όηη νη εγέηεο ησλ 2 θνηλνηήησλ κπνξνύλ λα βξνπλ ιύζε (ή νη 
δηαπξαγκαηεύζεηο ξίρλνπλ ζηάθηε ζηα κάηηα καο?) 
8. Βάζεη ζεκεξηλώλ δεδνκέλσλ ηί ζα απαληνύζαηε ζε έλα κειινληηθό αλάινγν 
ζρέδην ιύζεο? Πνηά ζα ήηαλ ηα θξηηήξηα πνπ ζα παίξλαηε ηελ νπνηαδήπνηε 
απάληεζε? 
9.  Πνηά πηζηεύεηε ζα είλαη ε αληίδξαζε ησλ Δ/Κ ζε έλα νπνηνλδήπνηε επόκελν 
ζρέδην? (Τπάξρεη ε ζέιεζε λα ιπζεί?) 
10. Έρεηε δηαβάζεη πνηέ ην ζρέδην Αλάλ ή έζησ κέξνο απηνύ? Πνηά είλαη ηα 
ζπκπεξάζκαηά ζαο? 
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11. Τπάξρεη θάπνην ηδηαίηεξν ζεκείν πνπ πηζηεύεηο όηη ην ζρέδην Αλάλ ήηαλ 
πξνβιεκαηηθό θαη ιόγσ απηνύ απνξξίθζεθε ή ζεσξείο όηη όιν ην ζρέδην ήηαλ έλα 
ράνο? 
12. Πνηόο ζεσξείηε ήηαλ ν θπξηόηεξνο ιόγνο πνπ ην ζρέδην Αλάλ απνξξίθζεθε κε 
πάλσ από 75% από ηελ Δ/Κ θνηλόηεηα? 
13. Μεηά από 6 ρξόληα πνηά είλαη ηα ζρόιηα ζαο γηα ην ζρέδην Αλάλ? Υάζακε κηα 
κεγάιε επθαηξία επίιπζεο ηνπ Κππξηαθνύ? 
14. Θεσξείο όηη νη Σ/Κ ζέινπλ λα βξεζεί ιύζε κεηαμύ ησλ δύν θνηλνηήησλ? 
15. Έρεηο κηιήζεη/ζπλαληεζεί πνηέ κε Σ/Κ? Πνηά ήηαλ ηα ζπλαηζζήκαηά ζνπ? 
(έλνησζεο έζησ θαη κηα ζηηγκή όηη είλαη ν ερζξόο ζνπ?) 
16. Πηζηεύεηο όηη κπνξείο λα δήζεηο καδί κε ηνπο Σ/Κ?Να ππάξμεη ακνηβαία 
εκπηζηνζύλε? 
17. Έρεηο επηζθεθζεί πνηέ ηα θαηερόκελα? Αλ λαη, ηί εληππώζεηο ζνπ έκεηλαλ θη αλ 
όρη  γηα πνηό ιόγν δελ ηα επηζθέθζεθεο αθόκε? 
18. ΢ηηο 18 Απξηιίνπ είλαη νη εθινγέο ησλ Σ/Κ. ΢ε πνηό βαζκό πηζηεύεηο όηη 
επεξεάδεηαη ε Δ/Κ πιεπξά αλ ν Έξνγινπ (ππνςήθηνο ηνπ εζληθηζηηθνύ 
θόκκαηνο)θεξδίζεη ηηο εθινγέο? 
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Appendix 3: Focus Group‟s questions (translated in English) 
1. Every day we hear on the news that the solution of the Cyprus problem will be 
based on the Bi-communal, Bi-zonal Federation. To what extend are you familiar 
with these concepts? Do you have in mind what does each one separately means?  
2. If you had to choose between Bi-zonal, Bi-communal Federation or dichotomy, 
what would you prefer?  
3. After the accession of Cyprus in the EU, do you feel that something has changed? 
For example, do you fell more secure that someone will protect you against the 
Turkish-Cypriots and in projection Turkey? 
4. Do you like the political situation of Cyprus as it is today? (Stagnant, divided in 
two parts) 
5. Are you interested for a solution to be found to the Cyprus problem? 
6. Do you believe that we can live harmonically after a plan for the solution? (Under 
what circumstances?) 
7. Do you believe that the leaders of both communities can find a solution? Or do 
the negotiations throw ash in our eyes? 
8. Based on today‟s facts, what would you vote for a future appropriate plan to be 
the solution of Cyprus? What would be your criteria which you would consider 
for any decision? 
9.  Which do you believe, will be the reaction of the Greek-Cypriots to any next 
plan? (is there a strong demand for a solution?) 
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10.  Have you ever read the Annan Plan or any part of it? What is your conclusion? 
11.  Is there any specific point that you believe that the Annan Plan was problematic 
and it is for this reason that it was rejected? Or do you consider that the whole 
plan was a mess? 
12.  Which do you consider that was the main reason for which the Annan Plan was 
rejected with more than 75% of the Greek-Cypriot community? 
13.  After six years, what are your comments about the Annan Plan? did we really 
loose a great chance for the solution of the Cyprus problem? 
14.  Do you consider that the Turkish-Cypriots want a solution to be found between 
the two communities? 
15.  Have you ever spoken/met with a Turkish-Cypriot? What were your feelings? 
(Did you feel at any moment that s/he is your enemy?) 
16.  Do you believe that you can live together with the Turkish-Cypriot? Can be 
created a mutual trust? 
17. Did you ever visit the occupied areas? If Yes, what was your impression and if 
not what was the reason that you did not visit it until now?  
18.  On 18th April the elections of Turkish-Cypriots will take place. To what extend 
do you believe that the elections affect the Greek-Cypriot side, if Mr. Eroglu 
(candidate of the Nationalistic Party) wins the elections?  
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Appendix 4: Resolution 353/1974.  
 
Adopted by the Security Council 
 20
th
 July 1974 
 The Security Council,  
 Having considered the report of the Secretary-General, at its 1779th meeting, about 
the recent developments in Cyprus,  
 Having heard the statement of the President of the Republic of Cyprus and the 
statements of the representatives of Cyprus, Turkey, Greece and other Member States,  
 Noting also from the report the conditions prevailing in the island,  
 Deeply deploring the outbreak of violence and the continuing bloodshed,  
 Gravely concerned about the situation which has led to a serious threat to 
international peace and security, and which has created a most explosive situation in 
the whole Eastern Mediterranean area,  
 Equally concerned about the necessity to restore the constitutional structure of the 
Republic of Cyprus, established and guaranteed by international agreements,  
 Conscious of its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and 
security in accordance with Article 24 of the Charter of the United Nations,  
 1. Calls upon all States to respect the sovereignty, independence and territorial 
integrity of Cyprus.  
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 2. Calls upon all parties to the present fighting as a first step to cease all firing and 
requests all States to exercise the utmost restraint and to refrain from any action which 
might further aggravate the situation;  
 3. Demands an immediate end to foreign military intervention in the Republic of 
Cyprus that is in contravention of the provisions of paragraph 1 above;  
 4. Requests the withdrawal without delay from the Republic of Cyprus of foreign 
military personnel present otherwise than under the authority of international 
agreements, including those whose withdrawal was requested by the President of the 
Republic of Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios, in his letter of 2 July 1974;  
 5. Calls upon Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland to enter into negotiations without delay for the restoration of peace in the area 
and constitutional government of Cyprus and to keep the Secretary-General informed;  
 6. Calls upon all parties to co-operate fully with the United Nations Peace-keeping 
Force in Cyprus to enable it to carry out its mandate;  
7. Decides to keep the situation under constant review and asks the Secretary-General 
to report as appropriate with a view to adopting further measures in order to ensure 
that peaceful conditions are restored as soon as possible. 
 Adopted unanimously at the 1781
st
 meeting 
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Appendix 5: Resolution 541/1983 
 Adopted by the Security Council  
 on 18 November 1983  
 The Security Council,  
 Having heard the statement of the Foreign Minister of the Government of the 
Republic of Cyprus,  
 Concerned at the declaration by the Turkish Cypriot authorities issued on 15 
November 1983 which purports to create an independent state in northern Cyprus,  
 Considering that this declaration is incompatible with the 1960 Treaty concerning the 
establishment of the Republic of Cyprus and the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee,  
 Considering therefore that the attempt to create a "Turkish Republic of Northern 
Cyprus", is invalid, and will contribute to a worsening of the situation in Cyprus,  
 Reaffirming its resolutions 365(1974) and 367(1975),  
 Aware of the need for a solution of the Cyprus problem, based on the mission of 
good offices undertaken by the Secretary-General,  
 Affirming its continuing support for the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in 
Cyprus,  
 Taking note of the Secretary-General's statement of 17 November 1983,  
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 1. Deplores the declaration of the Turkish Cypriot authorities of the purported 
secession of part of the Republic of Cyprus;  
 2. Considers the declaration referred to above as legally invalid and calls for its 
withdrawal;  
 3. Calls for the urgent and effective implementation of its resolutions 365(1974) and 
367(1975);  
 4. Requests the Secretary-General to pursue his mission of good offices in order to 
achieve the earliest possible progress towards a just and lasting settlement in Cyprus;  
 5. Calls upon the parties to cooperate fully with the Secretary-General in his mission 
of good offices;  
 6. Calls upon all States to respect the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity 
and non-alignment of the Republic of Cyprus;  
 7. Calls upon all States not to recognize any Cypriot state other than the Republic of 
Cyprus;  
8. Calls upon all States and the two communities in Cyprus to refrain from any action 
which might exacerbate the situation;  
 9. Requests the Secretary-General to keep the Security Council fully informed.  
 Adopted at the 2500th meeting by 13 votes to 1 against (Pakistan) with 1 abstention 
(Jordan).  
 
